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INTRODUCTION

E

mployees have enjoyed remarkable success in front of the
Supreme Court on statutory retaliation claims in the past few
1
years.
At a time when the success rate of employment
discrimination plaintiffs has been, at best, mixed, the Court has
consistently interpreted statutory prohibitions on employer retaliation
2
in a broad manner. Heading into its 2010 term, the Court had in
nearly every case adopted an interpretation of a statutory
3
antiretaliation provision that favors employees. With its decisions in
4
Thompson v. North American Stainless, LP and Kasten v. Saint5
Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., the Court kept the winning
streak of retaliation plaintiffs intact.
In Thompson, an employer was accused of retaliating against an
individual who had filed a sex discrimination charge with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) against the employer

1 See Richard Moberly, The Supreme Court’s Antiretaliation Principle, 61 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 375, 375 (2011) (noting the success rate of plaintiffs in cases involving
statutory retaliation claims).
2 Id.
3 Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., 129 S. Ct. 846 (2009);
CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries, 553 U.S. 442 (2008); Gomez-Perez v. Potter, 553 U.S.
474 (2008); Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006); Jackson v.
Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167 (2005); Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337,
346 (1997). The one exception to this trend was Clark County School District v. Breeden,
532 U.S. 268 (2001) (per curiam). In Garcetti v. Ceballos, the Court ruled against a public
employee on his claim that his First Amendment rights had been violated when the
employer allegedly retaliated against him on the basis of his speech. 547 U.S. 410, 426
(2006).
4 131 S. Ct. 863 (2011).
5 131 S. Ct. 1325 (2011).
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6

by firing the employee’s fiancé. The question facing the Court was
whether Title VII provides a remedy to an employee who has not
engaged in any type of protected activity but has nonetheless suffered
harm at the hands of the employer based on the protected activity of
another. Reasoning that an employee who is fired as a result of an
employer’s unlawful retaliation against another employee has been
“aggrieved” within the meaning of Title VII, the Court held that the
7
statute provides a remedy in such cases.
Kasten involved the meaning of the antiretaliation provision found
in the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). The plaintiff in Kasten had
been fired after repeatedly raising concerns with his supervisor and
others about a perceived violation of the FLSA wage and hour
8
standards. The plaintiff alleged retaliation under § 215(a)(3) of the
FLSA, which prohibits retaliation against an employee who has “filed
9
any complaint.” All of the plaintiff’s complaints about the perceived
violations were verbal in nature. Thus, the question was whether the
plaintiff had “filed” a complaint within the meaning of the Act. The
Court concluded that although the word “filed” could be interpreted to
refer only to written complaints, the word was also expansive enough
10
to include oral complaints.
At first glance at least, these decisions would seem to bode well for
retaliation plaintiffs proceeding under other federal employment
statutes. The decisions obviously help future, similarly situated
plaintiffs proceeding under the same statutes. But the decisions might
also assist similarly situated plaintiffs proceeding under other federal
workplace statutes. After all, courts frequently note their preference
for interpreting statutes governing the workplace so as to produce
11
consistency and uniformity.
Thus, a favorable Title VII or FLSA
retaliation decision from the Court might help a plaintiff alleging
12
retaliation under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
6

Thompson, 131 S. Ct. at 867.
Id. at 870.
8 Kasten, 131 S. Ct. at 1330.
9 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (2006).
10 Kasten, 131 S. Ct. at 1336.
11 See Darveau v. Detecon, Inc., 515 F.3d 334 (4th Cir. 2008) (noting the general
practice of federal courts in interpreting other statutes consistently with Title VII); Phillips
v. M.I. Quality Lawn Maint., Inc., No. 10-20698, 2010 WL 4237619, at *4 n.7 (S.D. Fla.
Oct. 21, 2010) (“[C]ourts routinely examine FLSA retaliation claims under the same
standards as Title VII retaliation claims.”).
12 Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 and
29 U.S.C.).
7
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14

(ERISA) or the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA). So, with
plaintiffs winning once again in front of the Court, and with federal
courts laboring to produce consistency, now hardly seems like the
appropriate time to suggest that federal workplace retaliation law
needs serious revision.
I disagree. I think the string of good luck that retaliation plaintiffs
have enjoyed in front of the Court may be lulling proponents of robust
protection from retaliation into a false sense of security. Others have
noted how lower courts sometimes take a narrow view of statutory
antiretaliation provisions, even in the face of the Supreme Court’s
15
ostensibly broad reading of the same language.
The concern I
identify in this Article is different. My concern is that the text of
many antiretaliation provisions, coupled with the Court’s textualist
approach to interpretation, will leave courts with little choice but to
adopt narrow constructions of other antiretaliation provisions in the
future.
The majority of the Court’s retaliation decisions so far have
involved Title VII, the major player among federal employment
statutes. All of the other major federal employment statutes either
contain explicit prohibitions on employer retaliation or have been
16
held to prohibit employer retaliation.
But there are also a host of
other federal statutes—some well known, some relatively obscure—
17
that contain specific prohibitions on retaliation. There is certainly
some superficial similarity between all of these statutes in terms of
the language they use to address retaliation, and, in some instances,
the language used is functionally identical. A closer examination of
the statutory language reveals, however, that there is remarkably little
in the way of consistency of language among federal statutes
13

Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2654 (2006)).
See Duckworth v. Pratt & Whitney, Inc., 152 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1998) (stating in the
context of an FMLA retaliation case that “[w]e regard Title VII, ADEA, ERISA, and
FLSA as standing in pari passu and endorse the practice of treating judicial precedents
interpreting one such statute as instructive in decisions involving another”) (internal
quotations omitted); see also Phillips, 2010 WL 4237619, at *4 n.7 (“[C]ourts routinely
examine FLSA retaliation claims under the same standards as Title VII retaliation
claims.”).
15 See Deborah L. Brake & Joanna L. Grossman, The Failure of Title VII as a RightsClaiming System, 86 N.C. L. REV. 859, 905 (2008) (criticizing the lower courts for their
interpretation of the Court’s “material adversity” standard from Burlington Northern).
16 See generally Lynn Ridgeway Zehrt, Retaliation’s Changing Landscape, 20 GEO.
MASON U. C.R. L.J. 143, 161–64 (2010) (discussing different statutory approaches to
retaliation).
17 Id. at 162–63.
14
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prohibiting workplace retaliation.
The statutes employ a
bewildering variety of language, with the differences in text ranging
from the subtle (yet meaningful) to the dramatic. Accordingly, it is
exceedingly difficult to transfer interpretations and standards from
one statute to another.
As this Article attempts to illustrate, it is only a matter of time
before employment retaliation plaintiffs who are similarly situated to
plaintiffs who have won before the Court start losing. Indeed, some
of them are already losing in lower courts. And, as this Article
further attempts to illustrate, there is no good reason for the disparate
treatment. As the law currently exists, statutory retaliation plaintiffs
win or lose largely due to the accident of statutory text rather than the
fact that the law is operating as Congress envisioned or as part of a
coherent scheme of regulation. In short, the federal approach to
workplace retaliation is inefficient, unnecessarily complex, and in
need of major reform.
To that end, Part I catalogs the Supreme Court’s decisions on
employment retaliation and its relentless focus on statutory text. Part
II examines situations in which retaliation plaintiffs who are similarly
situated to those who have prevailed previously before the Court are
likely to eventually lose should the Court ever tackle the interpretive
issues in question. Part III discusses the unnecessary complexity and
lack of a coherent rationale that underlies the federal approach to
employment retaliation. In order to address these problems, Part IV
concludes by arguing in favor of a single antiretaliation provision that
would apply to all federal statutes that prohibit retaliation in private,
nonunion workforces.
I
WHY RETALIATION PLAINTIFFS HAVE WON SO FAR
A. The Fairness and Pragmatism Explanations
There are any number of plausible explanations for the Court’s
apparent sympathy for the victims of workplace retaliation. One can
be “pro-employer” and still be offended at the idea that an employer
took action against an employee because the employee did something
that the law allows or even encourages the employee to do. Cases
like Thompson, in which an employee is punished for the supposed
18 See generally id. at 162 (“[T]here are significant differences in the language of the
various retaliation provisions.”).
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sins of another, tend to provoke a visceral response that cuts across
19
Another explanation is that the Justices have
ideological lines.
recognized the obvious reality that if employers are free to retaliate
against employees who have taken action that tends to further the
substantive goals of a particular statute, the substantive goals of the
20
statute are less likely to be attained.
In the employment
discrimination context, this means that giving employers a broad
license to retaliate against employees who complain about or oppose
discrimination would undermine the goal of eliminating
21
discrimination in the workplace.
Thus, perhaps the Justices’
pragmatic concerns over the effect of retaliation on the operation of
statutes regulating the workplace are what drive the outcome of
22
retaliation cases before the Court.
Surveying fifty years of Supreme Court retaliation jurisprudence,
Professor Richard Moberly has concluded that the Court’s decisions
are premised upon a belief that “employees must be protected from
retaliation in order to further the enforcement of society’s civil and
23
criminal laws.”
According to Moberly, the principle that ties
together the various retaliation decisions over the years is the Court’s
view that antiretaliation protection serves “as a law-enforcement tool
that benefits society” as a whole rather than simply the employees in
24
question.
Because the Court views antiretaliation provisions
primarily as devices that further the ability of civil and criminal laws
to operate effectively, Moberly argues, the Court has been willing to
25
interpret the provisions broadly to further the societal interests.
These explanations certainly have a ring of truth to them and may,
to a large extent, explain the outcome of many of the retaliation cases
decided to date. But fairness and pragmatic concerns will permit a
judge to go only so far. Ultimately, a judge’s discretion is bounded
19 See David L. Hudson, Jr., Back at Ya, A.B.A. J., June 2011, at 21, 22 (noting that
“retaliation claims lack politically potent wording”).
20 See Matthew W. Green, Jr., Express Yourself: Striking a Balance Between Silence
and Active, Purposive Opposition Under Title VII’s Anti-Retaliation Provision, 28
HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 107, 120 (2010) (noting the Court’s rejection that permitting
retaliation undermines the statutory goal of eliminating discrimination).
21 Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., 129 S. Ct. 846, 852
(2009).
22 See Michael J. Zimmer, A Pro-Employee Supreme Court?: The Retaliation
Decisions, 60 S.C. L. REV. 917, 918 (2009) (arguing that the Court’s retaliation decisions
“are primarily a product of a pragmatic approach to judicial decision making”).
23 Moberly, supra note 1, at 380.
24 Id.
25 Id. at 381.
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by the text of whatever statute is at issue.
For a textualist or
formalist judge, the text is of primary concern and, in theory, fairness
or pragmatic concerns are not enough to overcome the plain meaning
27
of clear language.
In contrast, a purposivist judge is primarily
concerned with effectuating the legislative purpose underlying a
28
statute when interpreting statutory language; however, even a
purposivist judge concedes that the starting point of interpretation is
29
the text of the statute.
Historically, courts were more willing to gloss over statutory
language that seemed inconsistent with a clear legislative purpose or
that, if interpreted literally, might produce undesirable effects. When
interpreting a remedial statute, courts would frequently rely upon the
canon of construction calling for expansive interpretation of remedial
30
statutes. This was as true of statutes regulating the workplace as it
31
was of other types of statutes.
But as Professor Michael Zimmer
32
has noted, this canon has fallen out of favor in recent decades. In
the ADA context, for example, some of the more purposivist-minded
Justices on the Court could be found advancing this canon while
dissenting from the majority’s hyperliteral interpretation of the
ADA’s definition of disability in Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc. in
33
1999.
The rise of the textualist approach to statutory interpretation during
the 1980s and 1990s has had a dramatic impact on how judges
interpret statutes. Even the most devoted purposivist Justices on the
Court now feel compelled to emphasize text at the expense of
34
legislative purpose. Nowhere is the emphasis on text more apparent
than in the Court’s interpretation of antiretaliation provisions.
26 RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 13 (2008) (stating that a pragmatic
judge’s discretion is restrained by “a due regard for the integrity of the written word in . . .
statutes”).
27 See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION 228 (2000).
28 Id. at 221.
29 John F. Manning, Federalism and the Generality Problem in Constitutional
Interpretation, 122 HARV. L. REV. 2003, 2011 (2009).
30 See Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967).
31 See Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 445 U.S. 1, 13 (1980) (relying upon the canon in
interpreting a workplace safety statute).
32 Zimmer, supra note 22, at 949.
33 527 U.S. 471, 504 (1999) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
34 See Jonathan T. Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 3
(2006) (“[T]extualism has so succeeded in discrediting strong purposivism that it has led
even nonadherents to give great weight to statutory text.”).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2010084

LONG

532

1/31/2012 1:39 PM

OREGON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 90, 525

B. The Text-Based Explanation
Judges unquestionably bring their own judicial philosophies and
sensibilities to the task of statutory interpretation. A judge who is
most interested in effectuating the legislative purpose underlying a
particular statute may find ambiguity in statutory text more often than
35
a textualist. However, the ability of judges to stray from seemingly
clear language is limited, particularly in the modern age of
interpretive theory. As the following Part illustrates, the interpretive
issues the Court has faced thus far with respect to antiretaliation
provisions have all involved situations in which the textual
impediments to an expansive interpretation have posed, at most, weak
obstacles to the ultimate interpretations provided by the Court.
1. Retaliation and Adverse Employment Actions
In Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White, the
Supreme Court dealt with the scope of § 704(a), Title VII’s
antiretaliation provision. Specifically, the Court had to address
“whether Title VII’s antiretaliation provision forbids only those
employer actions and resulting harms that are related to employment
or the workplace” or whether it also covers nonemployment-related
36
actions.
A circuit split existed at the time of the decision. Some
courts took a restrictive view of the provision, concluding that, to be
actionable, the retaliation must “‘resul[t] in an adverse effect on the
37
“terms, conditions, or benefits” of employment.’” Other courts took
an even more restrictive view and adopted an “ultimate employment
decisio[n] standard, which limits actionable retaliatory conduct to acts
such as hiring, granting leave, discharging, promoting, and
38
compensating.”
Ultimately, the Court held unanimously that retaliation need not
affect the terms, conditions, or benefits of employment to be
39
actionable under Title VII.
Instead, “a plaintiff must show that a
35 See Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law,
1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 521 (noting the tendency of “strict constructionists” to find that the
meaning of a statute is apparent from its text); Molot, supra note 34, at 46 (suggesting
“that neither textualism nor purposivism is inherently more likely to find ambiguity or
clarity in the law,” but noting that “some textualists have sought to equate textualism with
just such a rush to clarity”).
36 Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 61 (2006).
37 Id. at 60 (quoting Von Gunten v. Maryland, 243 F.3d 858, 866 (4th Cir. 2001)).
38 Id. (quoting Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702, 707 (5th Cir. 1997))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
39 See id. at 68.
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reasonable employee would have found the challenged action
materially adverse, which in this context means it well might have
dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of
40
discrimination.”
Thus, for example, an employer’s filing of false
criminal charges against an employee in retaliation for the employee’s
41
filing of a complaint of discrimination could be actionable.
In reaching this decision, the Court focused heavily on the textual
differences between § 704(a) and § 703(a), Title VII’s
42
antidiscrimination provision. Section 703(a), the antidiscrimination
provision, makes it unlawful for an employer “to fail or refuse to hire
or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against
any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
43
privileges of employment.”
In contrast, § 704(a), Title VII’s
antiretaliation provision, contains no reference to hiring, firing, or the
“compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.”
Instead, the provision simply provides that it is unlawful for an
employer to “discriminate” against an employee for engaging in
protected activity without qualifying the word “discriminate” in any
44
manner. Thus, the logical implication, according to the Court, was
that Congress intended for the two provisions to carry different
45
meanings.
After dismissing any text-based objections to a broader reading of
the statutory text, the Court explained why, as a matter of policy, the
46
broader reading made more sense.
The Court explained that the
inclusion of the antiretaliation provision in Title VII was necessary to
effectuate the statute’s overarching goal of eliminating discrimination
47
in the workplace.
Without an antiretaliation provision, the
antidiscrimination provision could not operate because employees
48
would be hesitant to assert their rights.
From this premise, the
Court quite correctly observed that employer retaliation need not
necessarily involve employment-related actions to be effective in
40 Id. (quoting Rochon v. Gonzales, 438 F.3d 1211, 1219 (D.C. Cir. 2006)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
41 See id. at 64 (citing Berry v. Stevinson Chevrolet, 74 F.3d 980, 984, 986 (10th Cir.
1996)).
42 Id. at 61–62.
43 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006).
44 Id.
45 Burlington Northern, 548 U.S. at 63.
46 Id. at 65–66.
47 Id. at 63–64.
48 See supra notes 20–21 and accompanying text.
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discouraging employee participation in the process of rooting out
49
discrimination. Nonemployment-related forms of retaliation can be
just as effective in silencing employees. So, because the statutory text
could easily be construed in a manner consistent with these goals, the
Court so construed it.
To be clear, the Court’s material adversity standard was not
required by the text of the statute. A broader or narrower construction
50
might have been permissible. But before Justice Breyer—perhaps
the leading proponent of a more purposivist-oriented approach to
51
interpretation —could pick and choose from the range of permissible
constructions, he first had to contend with the textual obstacles to
those constructions. And, in this instance, the text presented little in
the way of obstacle and strongly suggested a more expansive
interpretation of § 704(a) of the sort the Court ultimately adopted.
2. Internal Complaints and Other Forms of Opposition Conduct
a. Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp.
Justice Breyer, again writing for the Court, took a similar approach
in the Kasten decision from 2011. As mentioned above, the Kasten
52
Court, in a six-to-two decision, held that the FLSA affords
protection from retaliation to an employee who makes an oral
complaint of a violation of the Act. In reaching this decision, the
Court explained why it would make more sense, from a policy
perspective, to interpret the statute in this manner rather than limit
coverage to the filing of written complaints. The Court reasoned that
restricting application of § 215(a)(3) to the filing of written
complaints would reduce the effectiveness of the Act in
accomplishing one of its main goals: deterring unhealthy working
53
conditions.
A requirement that complaints must be in writing
before an employee can be protected would limit the ability of
illiterate, uneducated, or overworked employees to take advantage of
54
the Act’s complaint procedure.
The Court also suggested that a
written-complaint requirement would impede the government’s
ability to receive complaints through the use of hotlines and other oral
49
50
51
52
53
54

Burlington Northern, 548 U.S. at 63–64.
See Zimmer, supra note 22, at 927.
Mark Tushnet, Heller and the Critique of Judgment, 2008 SUP. CT. REV. 61, 77 n.57.
131 S. Ct. 1325, 1328–29 (2011). Justice Kagan did not participate.
Id. at 1333.
Id.
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55

methods of gathering information.
Finally, the Court noted that a
written-complaint requirement “would discourage the use of desirable
56
informal workplace grievance procedures.”
But before the Court allowed itself to expound on the benefits of a
construction favoring protection of the filing of oral complaints, it
first had to satisfy itself and readers that such a construction was
permissible. Thus, the Court devoted considerable time to explaining
why the language at issue was subject to competing interpretations.
To do this, Justice Breyer provided three different dictionary
definitions of the word “file,” multiple examples from state statutes,
examples from federal regulations, examples from state and federal
judicial opinions, other usages of the term within the FLSA itself, and
other usages of the term in other federal statutes containing
57
antiretaliation provisions.
Only after exhausting these varied
sources and establishing that the term “file” could plausibly have
different meanings did the Court look to the “functional
58
considerations” supporting its ultimate construction of the Act.
Justice Breyer’s opinion drew a dissent from Justice Scalia, who
was joined by Justice Thomas. According to Justice Scalia, Justice
Breyer’s reading of 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) impermissibly divorced the
“filed any complaint” language from the rest of the language in the
59
section.
In full, § 215(a)(3) provides that it is unlawful for an
employer
to discharge or in any other manner discriminate against any
employee because such employee has filed any complaint or
instituted or caused to be instituted any proceeding under or related
to [the Act], or has testified or is about to testify in any such
proceeding,60or has served or is about to serve on an industry
committee.

Justice Scalia noted that “the phrase ‘filed any complaint’ appears
alongside three other protected activities: ‘institut[ing] or caus[ing] to
be instituted any proceeding under or related to this chapter,’
‘testif[ying] in any such proceeding,’ and ‘serv[ing] . . . on an
61
As each of these activities “involves an
industry committee.’”
55
56
57
58
59
60
61

Id. at 1334.
Id.
Id. at 1331–33.
Id. at 1333.
See id. at 1337 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority’s interpretation).
29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (2006).
Kasten, 131 S. Ct. at 1338 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
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interaction with governmental authority,” the phrase “filed any
complaint” should be similarly construed to require interaction with
62
Thus, in Justice Scalia’s view, it is only
governmental authority.
when an employee files a complaint with a judicial or administrative
63
authority that § 215(a)(3) protects the employee.
Justice Scalia’s reading of the statutory language is certainly a
permissible one. However, in light of the fact that the phrase “filed
any complaint” is removed from the other activities listed in
§ 215(a)(3) and the fact that § 215(a)(3) as a whole is hardly a model
64
of grammatical clarity, his is not the only reading of the language.
Therefore, because the text provided only a weak obstacle to Justice
Breyer’s reading of the statute, a majority of Justices perhaps felt
comfortable enough to adopt the construction that best complied with
their own views as to the proper role of antiretaliation provisions.
b. Crawford v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville & Davidson
County
The Court’s interpretive method in Kasten was somewhat similar
to its earlier approach in Crawford v. Metropolitan Government of
65
Nashville & Davidson County. In Crawford, an employee alleged
that her employer retaliated against her after she provided information
about prior instances of harassment involving a supervisor as part of
the employer’s internal investigation into another employee’s similar
66
allegations against the supervisor.
In response to the employer’s
questions, the employee gave “an ostensibly disapproving account” of
67
the supervisor’s past behavior. The question, then, was whether the
employee’s actions amounted to protected activity.
Title VII’s antiretaliation provision, § 704(a), provides protection
for two types of plaintiffs: those who have opposed unlawful conduct
and those who have “made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated
in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this
62

Id.
Id. at 1337. Technically, the Court did not rule on the question of whether §
215(a)(3) protects the filing of intracompany complaints, citing the employer’s failure to
raise the argument in response to Kasten’s petition for certiorari. Id. at 1336. However, as
Justice Scalia noted in his dissent, the Court seemed to assume that such complaints could
be protected. Id. at 1341.
64 Congress’s strange use of commas—or lack thereof—in § 215(a)(3) makes the
provision particularly difficult to comprehend.
65 129 S. Ct. 846 (2009).
66 Id. at 849.
67 Id. at 850.
63
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68

subchapter.”
In concluding that the employee’s actions were
protected, the Court could have held that voluntary participation in an
employer’s internal investigation is protected under the second clause
of § 704(a), the so-called “participation” clause. However, the text of
§ 704(a) presented the Court with a significant hurdle in that respect.
Virtually every federal court has concluded that filing an internal
complaint or participating in an employer’s internal investigation is
69
not protected under Title VII’s participation clause.
These courts
have pointed out that, under the language of § 704(a), the
“investigation, proceeding, or hearing” in which an employee
participates must be one that arises “under this subchapter.” The
participation clause, in the view of these courts, is therefore designed
to protect an employee who has participated in the “machinery
available to seek redress for civil rights violations,” not those who
70
have participated in internal investigations.
Faced with this textual hurdle in Crawford, Justice Souter, writing
for a unanimous Court, instead chose to categorize the employee’s act
of providing information as part of an internal investigation as
“opposition” conduct and expressly declined to consider whether the
71
conduct might also be classified as “participation” conduct. Justice
72
Souter first looked to dictionary definitions of the term “oppose.”
He was then able to conclude fairly quickly that the Crawford
plaintiff’s act of providing “an ostensibly disapproving account” of
the supervisor’s past behavior amounted to “opposition,” even if she
provided the information in response to a question rather than
73
volunteering it.
3. Third-Party Retaliation
Thompson provides another recent example of the Court’s focus on
text in the retaliation context. As discussed above, Thompson
involved a case of third-party retaliation under Title VII. There was
68

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006).
Alex B. Long, The Troublemaker’s Friend: Retaliation Against Third Parties and the
Right of Association in the Workplace, 59 FLA. L. REV. 931, 953–54 (2007) (“Federal
courts uniformly have held that resort to an employer’s internal procedures for handling
discrimination does not fall under the participation clause for purposes of a retaliation
claim, at least prior to the filing of an EEOC charge, because such conduct does not relate
to an investigation, proceeding, or hearing authorized by Title VII.”).
70 Booker v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 879 F.2d 1304, 1313 (6th Cir. 1989).
71 Crawford, 129 S. Ct. at 853.
72 Id. at 850.
73 Id.; accord id. at 852.
69
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little dispute in the years following Burlington Northern that it was
unlawful for an employer to take action against one employee in
74
retaliation of another employee’s protected activity under Title VII.
The question was whether the actual victim of this type of third-party
retaliation had a remedy in such cases. In Thompson, the Court had
two options from which to choose in concluding that a victim of thirdparty retaliation has a remedy under Title VII. The first approach was
to use § 706, Title VII’s remedies section, as the statutory hook.
Section 706(f)(1) provides that any person aggrieved by unlawful
employer conduct can file a complaint. As discharging one employee
in retaliation for another employee’s protected activity is unlawful,
the argument goes, the first employee is aggrieved by the employer’s
unlawful conduct and is entitled to a remedy.
The second approach was to interpret § 704(a), Title VII’s
antiretaliation provision, to provide a remedy to the victim of thirdparty retaliation. This option would have provided the most direct
solution to the problem of third-party retaliation. However, it was
also a solution that presented the Court with a potentially significant
textual hurdle. Section 704(a) provides that it is unlawful for an
employer to retaliate against an individual “because he has opposed
any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this
subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or
participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing
75
under this subchapter.” Read literally, the statute requires that the
person who is retaliated against also be the person who engaged in the
protected activity. This is how the majority of federal courts
76
interpreted the language prior to Thompson.
A few federal courts had been willing prior to Thompson to read
the statutory language in a manner consistent with the obvious
purpose of the statute so as to prevent employers from deterring
employees from taking protected activity for fear that a friend or
77
loved one might suffer. Importantly, the EEOC had long taken the
position that the retaliation in such cases could be challenged by

74 See Freeman v. Barnhart, No. C 06-04900 JSW, 2008 WL 744827, at *7 (N.D. Cal.
Mar. 18, 2008); Mutts v. S. Conn. State Univ., No. 3:04 CV 1746(MRK), 2006 WL
1806179, at *11 (D. Conn. June 28, 2006).
75 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006) (emphasis added).
76 Long, supra note 69, at 934.
77 See, e.g., Gonzalez v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Corr. Servs., 122 F. Supp. 2d 335, 347
(N.D.N.Y. 2000); EEOC v. Nalbandian Sales, Inc., 36 F. Supp. 2d 1206, 1210 (E.D. Cal.
1998).
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either the party who engaged in the protected activity or the party who
78
suffered the adverse action. Thus, the Court could have also relied
on principles of agency deference in support of a broad construction
of § 704(a). However, in order to construe the language in this
manner, the Court would have had to give short shrift to the actual
text and rely heavily on a combination of policy-based arguments,
79
agency deference, and absurdity arguments.
Not surprisingly, the Court, in a unanimous, eight-Justice decision
authored by Justice Scalia, chose the path of least resistance offered
80
by § 706. The only obstacle to concluding that the victim of thirdparty retaliation is a “person aggrieved” within the meaning of Title
VII was the possibility that the term could be construed to mean
anyone with Article III standing, a result Justice Scalia deemed to be
81
extreme and too expansive.
There was decisional law from the
82
Court in another context suggesting such an interpretation.
However, this precedent posed only a minor obstacle to a more
narrow interpretation of the “person aggrieved” language insofar as
the Court was able to characterize the decision as dicta (and dicta that
83
was “ill-considered” at that). Thus, the text of § 706 and relevant
decisional law provided little obstacle to the Court’s ultimate
conclusion.
4. Other Examples of the Court’s Textualist Approach
In the other recent cases involving construction of statutory
antiretaliation provisions, the Court has repeatedly stressed the idea
that its broad interpretations have been grounded in the text or at least
are permissible under the text. In Jackson v. Birmingham Board of
84
the Court held that Title IX of the Education
Education,
85
Amendments of 1972 prohibits recipients of federal education
funding from retaliating against an individual who complains about
unlawful sex discrimination, despite the absence of any express
78 Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 131 S. Ct. 863, 871 (2011) (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring) (quoting the EEOC compliance manual).
79 See Nalbandian Sales, 36 F. Supp. at 1212 (advancing an absurdity argument in
support).
80 Thompson, 131 S. Ct. at 870. Justice Kagan did not participate.
81 Id. at 869.
82 Id. (citing Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972)).
83 Id. at 869–70.
84 544 U.S. 167 (2005).
85 Pub. L. No. 92–318, 86 Stat. 373 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1681–1688
(2006)).
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86

statutory prohibition on retaliation.
Relying upon Title IX’s
prohibition on sex discrimination, the Court neatly concluded that
“[r]etaliation against a person because that person has complained of
sex discrimination is another form of intentional sex discrimination
87
encompassed by Title IX’s private cause of action.” Thus, when a
defendant retaliates against an individual because the individual
complained of sex discrimination, the defendant has discriminated on
88
the basis of sex in violation of Title IX.
The Court conceivably could have relied upon a Department of
Education regulation that prohibited retaliation in this context. Yet
the Court expressly disavowed any reliance on the regulations,
stating, “[W]e do not rely on the Department of Education’s
regulation at all, because the statute itself contains the necessary
89
prohibition.” The Court’s conclusion drew a stinging response from
Justice Thomas, who was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and
90
Justices Scalia and Kennedy. Thomas and Scalia again dissented in
two subsequent cases, Gomez-Perez v. Potter and CBOCS West, Inc.
v. Humphries, when the Court employed a similar analytical approach
in concluding that § 1981 and the federal-sector provision of the
ADEA prohibit retaliation despite the absence of any express
91
prohibition.
Justices Thomas and Scalia were joined by Chief
92
Justice Roberts in the latter case.
In these cases, the text provided a greater impediment to an
expansive interpretation concerning protection from retaliation than in
other cases in that the statutes were silent on the subject of retaliation.
This perhaps explains the greater division within the Court and the
dissents of the more textualist-minded members of the Court in
particular. However, silence is an obstacle more easily overcome
than actual language that is contrary to a particular construction. In
these cases, the more significant hurdle to an expansive interpretation
was existing precedent. In each case, there were prior decisions of the

86

Jackson, 544 U.S. at 171.
Id. at 173.
88 Id. at 174.
89 Id. at 178.
90 See id. at 184 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for ignoring statutory
text).
91 Gomez-Perez v. Potter, 553 U.S. 474, 506 (2008) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (discussing
the federal-sector provision of the ADEA); CBOCS W., Inc. v. Humphries, 553 U.S. 442,
457 (2008) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (discussing § 1981).
92 Gomez-Perez, 553 U.S. at 492 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
87
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Court that were in tension with the Court’s ultimate interpretation.
But precedent can be distinguished more easily than language can be
read to mean something contrary to what it seems to say. Thus, a
majority of Justices were willing to sign on to each of these opinions
and recognize the existence of statutory protection from retaliation.
C. Summary
Textualism has won the war with respect to the interpretation of
statutory antiretaliation provisions. Justice Breyer perhaps said it best
in Burlington Northern when, in construing § 704(a), he noted that
“purpose reinforces what language already indicates”—in that
94
instance, that § 704(a) provided broad coverage from retaliation.
95
Breyer’s use of the word “reinforces” is instructive.
Jackson, CBOCS West, and Gomez-Perez are as close as the Court
has come to departing from statutory text in order to recognize a
plaintiff’s right to recover for employer retaliation. And, even in
these cases, the Court has stressed its fidelity to the text. The statutes
in question presented the Court with interpretive problems in the
sense that they did not specifically speak to the question of retaliation.
However, the Court has yet to confront statutory antiretaliation
language that strongly suggests a restrictive interpretation with
96
respect to protection from retaliation.
This emphasis on text is, of course, consistent with the rise of
textualism in other contexts. But textualism’s triumph in the statutory
retaliation field is noteworthy in at least two respects. First, it stands

93 See Zimmer, supra note 22, at 922–23, 929–32 (noting the important role precedent
played in the decisions).
94 Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 64 (2006) (emphasis
added).
95 See generally Zehrt, supra note 16, at 177 (noting the Court’s reliance on text and
precedent rather than policy in interpreting antiretaliation provisions).
96 The plaintiff in Clark County School District v. Breeden lost before the Court, but the
Court’s decision did not require interpretation of the statute. 532 U.S. 268, 274 (2001)
(per curiam). Instead, the Court assumed that the lower court’s interpretation was correct,
but held that, as applied, the interpretation still precluded the plaintiff from winning. Id. at
270–71. The only noteworthy exception to the winning streak of retaliation plaintiffs is
Garcetti v. Ceballos. 547 U.S. 410 (2006). There, an employee claimed he had been
retaliated against after speaking out about unlawful activity on the part of a prosecutor’s
office. Id. at 415. In a five-to-four decision, the Court held that the employee’s claim
failed because the employee’s allegedly protected activity arose out of his job duties. Id.
at 424. Although an employment retaliation case, Garcetti is also a constitutional case.
Id. at 417–20. Thus, the rules with which the Court had to contend were largely judgemade as opposed to statutory in nature.
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in contrast to the Court’s interpretive approach with respect to the
antidiscrimination provisions contained in first-generation
employment discrimination statutes like Title VII. As one author has
noted, Title VII’s basic directive amounts to little more than “Thou
97
shalt not discriminate.”
Title VII is a broadly worded statute that
98
leaves judges with significant room to shape policy. Given the lack
of specificity in Title VII’s language, it is not surprising that many of
the landmark Title VII cases—including McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
99
100
Green and Griggs v. Duke Power Co. —make only passing
reference to the statutory text, and the tests that emerged from these
101
cases were almost totally judge-made.
And at the time of some of
the most important decisions, textualism had not yet gained
102
ascendancy.
Even with the rise of textualism, the broadly worded
text of Title VII still sometimes forces the Court to engage in
common-law rulemaking that has only a limited connection to the
103
text.
Even when a discrimination statute employed more specific
language, federal courts sometimes paid relatively little attention to
104
that language. For example, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973
employed the same definition of disability that was later used in the
105
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).
For several years prior to
the passage of the ADA, federal courts sometimes barely paused to

97 Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr., The Americans with Disabilities Act: Analysis and
Implications of a Second-Generation Civil Rights Statute, 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
413, 413 (1991) (explaining that many earlier civil rights statutes took this approach).
98 See id. at 515.
99 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
100 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
101 See generally Charles A. Sullivan, The World Turned Upside Down?: Disparate
Impact Claims by White Males, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1505, 1507 (2004) (referring to the
Supreme Court’s disparate impact jurisprudence as “judicially-created”).
102 See generally Molot, supra note 34, at 24 (identifying the 1980s and 1990s as the
starting point for modern textualism).
103 Alex B. Long, “If the Train Should Jump the Track . . .”: Divergent Interpretations
of State and Federal Employment Discrimination Statutes, 40 GA. L. REV. 469, 486–89
(2006) (explaining how the Supreme Court’s approach to some employment
discrimination statutes “resembles common law rulemaking and constitutional
interpretation more than traditional statutory interpretation”).
104 29 U.S.C. §§ 701–794 (2006).
105 Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, § 3(2)(A), 104 Stat.
327, 330 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (2006)); Stephen F. Befort,
Let’s Try This Again: The ADA Amendments Act of 2008 Attempts to Reinvigorate the
“Regarded as” Prong of the Statutory Definition of Disability, 2010 UTAH L. REV. 993,
998.
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even question whether an individual satisfied the same statutory
106
The Act’s
definition employed in the Rehabilitation Act.
definition of disability was packed with terms in need of
interpretation, yet federal courts often failed to parse the language.
107
Indeed, in School Board of Nassau County v. Arline,
the Court
quickly glossed over the same language that it would later focus
intently on in the ADA context and adopted an expansive
108
interpretation of the Rehabilitation Act’s definition of disability.
However, in a series of decisions in 1999, the Supreme Court engaged
in a painstaking (and painful) parsing of the ADA’s statutory
definition of disability and adopted a strict construction of the terms
109
within that definition.
In contrast to the Court’s discrimination decisions, the Court’s
retaliation decisions have all taken place since textualism’s rise to
power. And in general, antiretaliation provisions tend to be wordier
than the antidiscrimination provisions with which the Court has
historically dealt. There have been several cases in which the relevant
provision contained no explicit mention of protection from
110
retaliation.
But aside from these cases, the Court has been required
to parse text to determine the scope of an individual’s protection from
retaliation.
The other noteworthy feature of textualism’s triumph in the field of
statutory antiretaliation law is the fact that plaintiffs have had far
greater success in their statutory retaliation claims than have
discrimination plaintiffs. Discrimination plaintiffs have had less
success under broadly worded statutes like Title VII than have
retaliation plaintiffs. But discrimination plaintiffs have fared even
worse in the case of the ADA, which contains far more textual
111
detail.
Indeed, the Court’s increasingly textual approach has
repeatedly been identified as one of the main culprits behind ADA
106

See Long, supra note 103, at 529 (“Initially, relatively few individuals were denied
coverage under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.”).
107 480 U.S. 273 (1987).
108 See id. at 281 (concluding that the fact that plaintiff’s impairment was serious
enough to require hospitalization was “more than sufficient” to satisfy the statutory
definition of disability).
109 Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 565–67 (1999); Murphy v. United
Parcel Serv., Inc., 527 U.S. 516, 519 (1999); Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S.
471, 478–80 (1999) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
110 See supra notes 84–92 and accompanying text.
111 Ruth Colker, The Americans with Disabilities Act: A Windfall for Defendants, 34
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 99, 108–10 (1999).
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112

plaintiffs’ lack of success.
It seems odd, therefore, that a textualist
approach could produce such completely different outcomes in the
retaliation cases.
Perhaps this is why some have looked for some other explanation
for why the members of the Court seem to have particular sympathy
113
for the victims of employment retaliation.
To be sure, these
theories may go a long way toward explaining the outcomes of some
of the decisions. The Justices’ generally favorable views as to the
purpose of antiretaliation provisions or generally sympathetic views
of retaliation plaintiffs may, for example, explain how the plaintiffs in
Jackson, CBOCS West, and Gomez-Perez were able to garner a
majority in these decisions, which, given the absence of statutory text,
could easily have been decided differently. They might also help
explain how the plaintiff in Kasten was able to get several members
of the Court’s conservative wing to side with Justice Breyer’s more
expansive interpretation of the FLSA’s antiretaliation provision than
Justice Scalia’s more limited interpretation when either interpretation,
based on text alone, would have been plausible.
But, given the current composition of the Court, sympathy and
unifying theories will not permit a retaliation plaintiff to prevail when
the statutory language affirmatively suggests a contrary outcome. A
majority of Justices are of a textualist bent, and those who are not still
114
heavily stress statutory language.
For purposes of this Article,
there are two particularly noteworthy aspects to the Court’s retaliation
decisions. First is the extent to which the decisions emphasize text.
Culminating in Justice Breyer’s multipaged inquiry into the meaning
of the word “file” in Kasten, the Court has grounded its retaliation
decisions on statutory language even when that language has provided
only limited support for the Court’s conclusion. Subtle differences in
statutory text and single words have been decisive in the Court’s

112 See, e.g., Chai R. Feldblum, Definition of Disability Under Federal AntiDiscrimination Law: What Happened? Why? And What Can We Do About It?, 21
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 91, 93 (2000) (discussing the different interpretation and
struggles to define the protected class of ADA plaintiffs); Michael Selmi, Interpreting the
Americans with Disabilities Act: Why the Supreme Court Rewrote the Statute, and Why
Congress Did Not Care, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 522, 525 (2008) (acknowledging “that
the Supreme Court has read the ADA narrowly, and in a manner that is generally
inconsistent with congressional intent”).
113 See supra notes 20–21 and accompanying text.
114 See Zimmer, supra note 22, at 955–57 (classifying the interpretive approaches of the
members of the Court).
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analysis. Thus, the Court has established an interpretive template for
future decisions involving antiretaliation decisions.
Second, in each of the statutory retaliation cases in which plaintiffs
have prevailed, the text posed a relatively weak obstacle to an
interpretation that would provide protection from retaliation. In other
words, the texts permitted a majority of Justices in each case to
interpret the provision in a manner consistent with their natural
sympathies or their views as to the proper role of antiretaliation
provisions. When the text posed only a weak obstacle to an
expansive interpretation—as in Crawford—a clear majority formed
around the expansive interpretation. When, however, the language
posed a more formidable obstacle—as in Jackson, CBOCS West, and
Gomez-Perez—the more textualist-minded Justices were unable to
look past the obstacles; yet, the obstacles were formidable enough to
peel away the fifth vote necessary to provide for more expansive
coverage. As the rest of this Article argues, retaliation plaintiffs are
unlikely to enjoy this same success in future decisions.
II
WHY STATUTORY RETALIATION PLAINTIFFS WILL EVENTUALLY
START LOSING IN FRONT OF THE COURT
There are limits to a judge’s ability to find ambiguity or certainty
in statutory text. A judge’s inclination to follow congressional
purpose or take pragmatic concerns into account can overcome a
textual impediment if the text amounts only to a speed bump to the
judge’s approach. But when the text strongly suggests a particular
interpretation, a judge’s desire to further the perceived underlying
purpose of a statute or foster a desirable policy outcome tends to give
way. This is especially likely when a court has previously given great
weight to the presence or absence of particular language when
interpreting one statute, and the court then confronts a different
statute with the same language.
All of the major federal employment statutes have been held to
115
prohibit employer retaliation.
However, with the exception of Title
VII and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA),
115 However, not every statute provides for a private right of action. See George v.
Aztec Rental Ctr., Inc., 763 F.2d 184, 187 (5th Cir. 1985) (concluding that no private
cause of action exists for retaliatory discharge under OSHA); Hernandez v. Mohawk
Indus., Inc., No. 6:08-cv-927-Orl-28GJK, 2009 WL 3790369, at *5 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 10,
2009) (concluding that the Surface Transportation Assistance Act does not provide for a
private right of action).
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virtually none of them use the same language.
In some cases, these
linguistic differences may not present courts with any meaningful
challenges in interpretation. In others, however, the differences are
fairly substantial and are likely to mean that individuals who engage
in action that would clearly be protected under Title VII or the ADEA
will be unprotected. While there are any number of unresolved issues
involving the meaning of statutory antiretaliation provisions, the
following Part explores those situations in which the luck of
retaliation plaintiffs in front of the Supreme Court is most likely to
run out.
A. No Protection for Retaliation Not Amounting to an Ultimate
Employment Action
A clear example of how retaliation victims may be at the mercy of
the text of whatever the relevant statute may be is the situation in
which an employer retaliates against an employee but does not fire,
demote, or take similar employment-related actions. In Burlington
Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White, the Court held that Title
VII prohibits other forms of retaliation not necessarily connected to
117
the workplace.
As discussed, the Court was able to reach this
decision because the text of § 704(a) permitted and actually created at
least a weak presumption in favor of this construction of the statutory
118
text.
Whereas the statutory provision outlawing employment
discrimination specifically referred to employer actions affecting an
employee’s “compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment,” § 704(a), the antiretaliation provision, contained no
119
such limiting language.
Since the text of § 704(a) allowed for and
arguably encouraged a broad reading, the Court was able to also rely
on the strong policy arguments favoring the broad reading.
Most of the major federal employment statutes resemble § 704(a)
in that they are not limited to retaliation affecting “the compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.” The FMLA, for
116 The ADA’s antiretaliation provision employs language substantially similar to that
of Title VII and the ADEA. 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a) (2006). However, the ADA contains an
additional section that makes it unlawful for an employer to “coerce, intimidate, threaten,
or interfere with any individual in the exercise or enjoyment of, or on account of his or her
having exercised or enjoyed, or on account of his or her having aided or encouraged any
other individual in the exercise or enjoyment of, any right granted or protected by this
chapter.” Id. § 12203(b).
117 See supra notes 39–40 and accompanying text.
118 See supra notes 43–45 and accompanying text.
119 Id.
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example, provides that it is unlawful for an employer “to discharge or
in any other manner discriminate against any individual” who has
120
As a result, federal courts have
engaged in protected activity.
consistently held that Burlington Northern’s material adversity
121
standard applies to FMLA retaliation claims.
Courts have
similarly relied on the absence of any limiting language in concluding
that the Burlington Northern standard applies in ERISA and FLSA
122
retaliation cases.
Many of the lesser-known federal statutes that prohibit employer
retaliation, however, are by their terms limited to retaliation affecting
the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment. For example, the
123
Asbestos School Hazard Detection and Control Act
prohibits an
employer from “discharg[ing] any employee or otherwise
discriminat[ing] against any employee with respect to the employee’s
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment”
124
because the employee has engaged in protected activity.
The
Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1982 similarly provides that
it is unlawful to “discharge an employee, or discipline or discriminate
against an employee regarding pay, terms, or privileges of
employment” because the employee has engaged in protected
125
activity.
A host of other federal statutes contain similar
126
The same interpretive issue has arisen under parallel
language.
127
state statutes with mixed results.
120

29 U.S.C. §§ 2615(a)(2), (b) (2006) (emphasis added).
See, e.g., Millea v. Metro-N. R.R., Nos. 10-409-cv (L); 10-564-cv (XAP), 2011 WL
3437513, at *6 (2d Cir. Aug. 8, 2011); Metzler v. Fed. Home Loan Bank of Topeka, 464
F.3d 1164, 1171 n.2 (10th Cir. 2006).
122 Darveau v. Detecon, Inc., 515 F.3d 334, 343 (4th Cir. 2008) (adopting Burlington
Northern’s material adversity standard for use in FLSA retaliation claims); Mohamed v.
Sanofi-Aventis Pharm., No. 06 Civ. 1504, 2009 WL 4975260, at *22–24 (S.D.N.Y. Dec.
22, 2009) (stating, “In light of Burlington Northern, it would seem that retaliation under
ERISA section 510 is not limited to discriminatory actions that affect the terms and
conditions of employment,” but deciding the case on other grounds); Mercier v.
Boilermakers Apprenticeship & Training Fund, No. 07-cv-11307-DPW, 2009 WL 458556,
at *23 (D. Mass. Feb. 10, 2009) (concluding that retaliation under ERISA is not limited to
adverse employment actions).
123 Pub. L. No. 96-270, 94 Stat. 487 (codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3611 (2006)).
124 20 U.S.C. § 3608.
125 49 U.S.C. § 31105 (2006).
126 See infra Appendix.
127 See Alex B. Long, Viva State Employment Law! State Law Retaliation Claims in a
Post-Crawford/Burlington Northern World, 77 TENN. L. REV. 253, 272–73 (2010) (noting
conflicting results in decisions in Washington and California). Thus far, decisional law on
this issue involving the lesser-known federal statutes is sparse. Some courts have noted
that the difference in language poses an interpretive issue but have assumed, without
121
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The fact that a statute contains language specifically referring to an
employee’s pay, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment does
not necessarily mean that it is limited to retaliation involving
employment-related actions. A court could, as one has, conclude that
Congress’s use of these terms represented a “kitchen-sink attempt at
comprehensiveness, rather than a limitation by way of expressio
128
unius, and should be construed to mean ‘any adverse action.’”
However, the more natural reading of this kind of statutory language
would be to limit retaliation to adverse employment actions or
ultimate employment actions.
The fact that the Supreme Court placed such great emphasis on the
absence of the “compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment” language in reaching the opposite conclusion in the
Title VII context only supports this narrow reading of this kind of
statutory language; the Court’s focusing so heavily on the absence of
the language may prove exceedingly difficult to subsequently
overlook the presence of the same language in a different statute. The
likely result will be that employees who are unfortunate enough to
129
have to sue under these kinds of statutes will be denied protection.
B. No Protection for Making Internal Complaints or Providing
Information to an Employer
Another area in which some retaliation plaintiffs are currently
losing in the lower courts and are likely to lose in front of the
Supreme Court is where an employee complains or notifies an
employer about unlawful conduct.
At first, this seems
counterintuitive. An employee who complains internally to an
deciding, that Burlington Northern’s material adversity standard applies. See Melton v.
U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 373 F. App’x 572, 577 (6th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (noting the
difference in statutory language between Title VII and the Surface Transportation
Assistance Act, but declining to decide whether Title VII’s material adversity standard
applies).
128 See Mattei v. Mattei, 126 F.3d 794, 806 (6th Cir. 1997) (concluding the same result
about ERISA’s antiretaliation provision).
129 On their face, some statutes provide expansive protection from retaliation. For
example, the FMLA prohibits an employer from discharging “or in any other manner”
discriminating against an individual for engaging in protected activity. 29 U.S.C. § 2615
(2006). If given a literal interpretation, these statutes would establish a different standard
than the material adversity standard adopted by the Court in Burlington Northern in Title
VII cases. Despite this difference in text, some courts have adopted Burlington Northern’s
material adversity standard for use in FMLA retaliation cases. See, e.g., Wierman v.
Casey’s Gen. Stores, 638 F.3d 984, 999 (8th Cir. 2011); Metzler v. Fed. Home Loan Bank
of Topeka, 464 F.3d 1164, 1171 n.2 (10th Cir. 2006).
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employer about unlawful discrimination is protected from retaliation
under § 704(a) of Title VII, which protects one who has “opposed”
130
Even prior to the Court’s
unlawful employer discrimination.
decision in Kasten, the majority of federal appellate courts had
concluded that the FLSA’s antiretaliation provision protects an
131
employee who filed a written complaint internally,
and now the
Supreme Court has held that this protection extends to oral complaints
as well. One might logically assume then that, given the preference
of federal courts for uniform construction of the array of federal
employment statutes, making an internal, oral complaint of unlawful
conduct or providing information about such conduct is per se
protected conduct under federal law. However, a quick examination
of the language of ERISA and some of the other federal statutes
132
regulating the workplace should quickly dispel such confidence.
1. No Protection for Internal Complaints
In Kasten, the Court was able to conclude that filing an internal
oral complaint is protected conduct under the FLSA, in part, because
the “filed any complaint” language was sufficiently removed from the
language requiring interaction with the government to permit the
conclusion that an employee need not file a formal complaint with a
133
Not every
court or government agency in order to be protected.
antiretaliation provision is structured in this manner. To the extent
some statutes protect the filing of complaints or the providing of
130 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006); Abramson v. William Paterson Coll. of N.J., 260
F.3d 265, 268 (3d Cir. 2001); Sumner v. U.S. Postal Serv., 899 F.2d 203, 209 (2d Cir.
1990); B. Glenn George, Revenge, 83 TUL. L. REV. 439, 448 (2008). The FMLA also
contains this “opposition” language, and several courts have concluded that one who
complains internally to an employer is protected from retaliation under the FMLA. See
Schrieber v. Fed. Express Corp., 698 F. Supp. 2d 1266 (N.D. Okla. 2010) (denying the
defendant’s summary judgment motion as to the plaintiff’s retaliation claim when the
plaintiff had filed an internal complaint related to alleged discrimination under the FMLA
and the ADEA); Mahoney v. Ernst & Young LLP, 487 F. Supp. 2d 780 (S.D. Tex. 2006)
(concluding that a letter to the employer from the employee’s attorney complaining about
denial of FMLA rights was protected under the FMLA’s opposition clause).
131 See Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 570 F.3d 834, 838 (7th Cir.
2009) (noting the “vast majority of circuit courts to consider this issue” had reached this
conclusion), rev’d on other grounds, Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp.,
131 S. Ct. 1325, 1336 (2011).
132 There are some federal statutes—such as the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural
Worker Protection Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1855(a)—that contain antiretaliation provisions that
closely resemble the FLSA’s and will therefore probably be interpreted consistent with
Kasten.
133 See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
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information, they do so with language that is closely connected to
language describing interaction with the government or a connection
to the formal mechanisms employed to enforce the relevant statute.
Thus, there is a strong chance that the Supreme Court would construe
any number of statutes so that providing information or filing a
complaint are protected activities only when conducted in connection
with a judicial or administrative proceeding.
The most obvious example of this type of statute is Title VII. Title
VII’s participation clause prohibits retaliation against an employee
because the employee “has made a charge, testified, assisted, or
participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing
134
under this subchapter.”
Each protected activity in the clause—
making a charge, testifying, assisting, and participating—is closely
linked to language referring to proceedings associated with Title VII.
Perhaps not surprisingly, virtually every federal court to consider the
issue has concluded that an employee who provides information as
part of an employer’s internal process or investigation into unlawful
discrimination is not protected under Title VII because the
participation clause extends only to conduct related to a formal
135
proceeding under Title VII.
Of course, the Supreme Court had the chance in Crawford v.
Metropolitan Government of Nashville & Davidson County to expand
the scope of protection from retaliation by holding that those who
participate in an internal proceeding or investigation are entitled to
136
protection under Title VII’s participation clause.
Instead, the Court
chose to categorize the employee’s act of providing information as
part of an internal investigation as “opposition” conduct and expressly
declined to consider whether the conduct might also be classified as
137
“participation” conduct.
While Crawford was considered a victory
for Title VII retaliation plaintiffs, it was not the kind of resounding
victory that would assist all similarly situated plaintiffs outside the
Title VII context. The Court’s silence on the question of whether
providing information as part of an internal investigation could be
protected “participation” conduct was deafening in the face of
overwhelming precedent among the lower courts that such conduct is
not protected under the participation clause. Thus, the Supreme
Court’s conspicuous silence in the face of the overwhelming majority
134
135
136
137

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).
See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
129 S. Ct. 846 (2009).
Id. at 853.
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approach in the Title VII context has obvious repercussions for
similarly situated plaintiffs who claim protection under similarly
worded antiretaliation provisions.
At least in the Title VII context, an employee who complains
internally about a possible Title VII violation may still be protected
under Title VII’s opposition clause.
However, most statutes
governing the workplace do not contain any “opposition”
138
language.
Thus, other retaliation plaintiffs may not be so fortunate.
The majority of courts to consider the issue have concluded that the
filing of an internal complaint is not protected activity under
139
ERISA.
ERISA’s antiretaliation provision provides that it is
unlawful for an employer to retaliate “against any person because he
has given information or has testified or is about to testify in any
inquiry or proceeding relating to this chapter or the Welfare and
140
Pension Plans Disclosure Act.”
An employee who complains
internally about a possible ERISA violation has certainly “given
information” as the Act requires. However, a slight majority of
federal appellate courts to consider the issue have concluded that an
employee who, unsolicited, complains internally to another employer
141
has not engaged in protected activity.
These courts have reasoned
that in the absence of an employer’s request for information, an
employee who complains internally is not giving information as part
142
of an “inquiry” or “proceeding.”
In addition, according to these
courts, the term “proceeding” refers to the formal process for
obtaining a remedy under the statute, not something as informal as the
143
making of an internal complaint.
In reaching these conclusions, courts have turned the different
language of Title VII and the FLSA against ERISA retaliation
plaintiffs. Title VII explicitly protects one who opposes unlawful
138

See infra Appendix.
Edwards v. A.H. Cornell & Son, Inc., 610 F.3d 217, 223 (3d Cir. 2010); Nicolaou v.
Horizon Media, Inc., 402 F.3d 325, 329 (2d Cir. 2005) (per curiam); King v. Marriott Int’l,
Inc., 337 F.3d 421, 427 (4th Cir. 2003). The Fifth and Ninth Circuits have held that such
conduct is protected under ERISA. Anderson v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 11 F.3d 1311,
1314 (5th Cir. 1994); Hashimoto v. Bank of Haw., 999 F.2d 408, 411 (9th Cir. 1993); see
also Jessica Barclay-Strobel, Comment, Shooting the Messenger: How Enforcement of
FLSA and ERISA Is Thwarted by Courts’ Interpretations of the Statutes’ Antiretaliation
and Remedies Provisions, 58 UCLA L. REV. 521, 533–36 (2010) (discussing the circuit
split on the issue).
140 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (2006).
141 See Barclay-Strobel, supra note 139.
142 Edwards, 610 F.3d at 223.
143 Id.
139
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discrimination. According to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit, Congress could have chosen to include similar “opposition”
language in ERISA’s antiretaliation provision but declined to do so.
Characterizing Congress’s inaction as a conscious choice, the court
concluded that Congress chose not to provide protection to those who
oppose or otherwise raise concerns internally about an ERISA
144
violation.
The Third Circuit has similarly turned the FLSA’s
language against ERISA retaliation plaintiffs. The court noted that
the FLSA prohibits retaliation against one who has “filed any
145
complaint,” which could include an internal complaint.
The words
“any complaint” are noticeably absent from ERISA’s language.
Therefore, while Kasten might suggest a more expansive reading of
ERISA’s language, Kasten’s conclusion that internal complaints are
protected under the FLSA does not necessarily require a parallel
146
conclusion under ERISA’s distinct statutory language.
ERISA and the FLSA actually use somewhat similar language in
their antiretaliation provisions. Thus, it may be that ERISA’s text
does not pose the sort of textual hurdle that is virtually
insurmountable if one desires a broad interpretation. However, other
statutes have similar gaps in coverage and contain language that is
perhaps more resistant to an expansive interpretation. For example,
147
the Immigration Reform and Control Act’s (IRCA)
antiretaliation
provision prohibits retaliation against one who has “filed a charge or a
complaint, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an
148
investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this section.”
This
language is obviously quite similar to Title VII’s participation clause,
thus suggesting a similarly restrictive interpretation. Outside of the
Title VII context, however, some courts have been more generous in
their interpretation of similarly worded statutes and have concluded
149
that internal complaints are protected.
But the differences in

144

Id.
Id. at 224.
146 Id. at 225.
147 8 U.S.C. §§ 1324a, 1324b (2006).
148 Id. § 1324b(a)(5) (emphasis added).
149 See Passaic Valley Sewerage Comm’rs v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 992 F.2d 474, 478
(3d Cir. 1993) (interpreting § 507(a) of the Clean Water Act to permit a retaliation claim
based on an internal complaint); Rayner v. Smirl, 873 F.2d 60, 64 (4th Cir. 1989)
(concluding that the Federal Railroad Safety Act protects the filing of internal complaints);
Phillips v. Interior Bd. of Mine Operations Appeals, 500 F.2d 772, 779 (D.C. Cir. 1974)
(concluding that internal complaints are protected under the Federal Coal Mine Health &
Safety Act, while recognizing that the holding extended beyond the literal language of the
145
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outcomes are sometimes dependent on minor variations among the
150
statutes, and the decisions are mixed.
There are strong arguments on both sides regarding the
interpretation of IRCA’s antiretaliation provision. The most natural
reading of the text would seem to require that the employee file a
151
complaint in connection with some type of formal process.
However, this is not the only possible reading of the text, and a
contrary reading certainly makes more sense as a policy matter. The
IRCA is designed, in part, to address employers’ discrimination
against “documented workers” because of their national origin or
citizenship and to criminalize the employment of undocumented
152
workers.
In many instances, the individuals most likely to be
affected by or have knowledge of such practices are those who, in the
words of one author, “often lack even the most rudimentary
understanding of their legal rights, are vulnerable to exploitation, and
153
are all but invisible to most of the citizenry.”
For example, in one
of the few reported IRCA retaliation cases, the employee who
154
complained to authorities spoke no English.
When interpreting the
FLSA’s ambiguous statutory language in Kasten, the Court noted that
it would undermine Congress’s purpose in protecting workers from
exploitive practices to limit the protection of the antiretaliation
provision to when an employee filed a written complaint. “Why,” the
Court asked, “would Congress want to limit the enforcement
scheme’s effectiveness by inhibiting use of the Act’s complaint
Act); Neal v. Honeywell, Inc., 826 F. Supp. 266, 273 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (concluding that the
False Claims Act prohibits retaliation based on the filing of an internal complaint).
150 Compare Brown & Root, Inc. v. Donovan, 747 F.2d 1029, 1031–32 (5th Cir. 1984)
(concluding that internal complaints are not protected under the Energy Reorganization
Act as originally codified), with Mackowiak v. Univ. Nuclear Sys., Inc., 735 F.2d 1159,
1163 (9th Cir. 1984) (reaching the opposite conclusion). The Third Circuit concluded in
Passaic Valley Sewerage Commissioners v. United States Department of Labor that the
Clean Water Act protected internal complaints. 992 F.2d at 480. Nearly twenty years
later, the same court was forced to distinguish the language of the Clean Water Act from
the similarly worded language of ERISA while concluding that ERISA did not protect one
who complains internally about an ERISA violation. Edwards v. A.H. Cornell & Son,
Inc., 610 F.3d 217, 223 (3d Cir. 2010).
151 See generally Phillips, 500 F.2d at 779 (concluding that internal complaints are
protected under the similarly worded Federal Coal Mine Health & Safety Act, while
recognizing that the holding extended beyond literal language of the Act).
152 Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 892 (1984); Jie v. Liang Tai Knitwear Co.,
107 Cal. Rptr. 2d 682, 687 (Ct. App. 2001).
153 Fran Ansley, Standing Rusty and Rolling Empty: Law, Poverty, and America’s
Eroding Industrial Base, 81 GEO. L.J. 1757, 1771 (1993).
154 Jie, 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 685.
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procedure by those who would find it difficult to reduce their
complaints to writing, particularly illiterate, less educated, or
155
One might make a similar argument with
overworked workers?”
respect to the IRCA: why would Congress want to limit the
enforcement scheme’s effectiveness by inhibiting use of the Act’s
complaint procedure by those who frequently lack an understanding
of their legal rights and the structures that protect those rights?
The difficulty with making this type of argument is that the text of
the IRCA poses a fairly significant obstacle to what is clearly the
better policy approach. Indeed, the interpretation of the IRCA
presents a classic illustration of the battle between text-based and
more pragmatic forms of interpretation. But given the Court’s past
approach to the interpretation of antiretaliation provisions, the textual
obstacles involving the IRCA and similarly worded statutes are likely
to prove too pronounced to permit a majority of the Court to adopt the
type of expansive interpretation it has adopted in the past.
2. No Protection for Providing Information to an Employer
A closely related problem involves the coverage of an employee
who provides information to an employer about a possible violation
of the law but does so in a nonconfrontational manner. Kasten clearly
provides protection for employees who affirmatively complain about
unlawful behavior under the FLSA. And Crawford held that an
employee who provides a “disapproving account” of an employee’s
behavior in response to employer questioning as part of an internal
investigation is entitled to protection under Title VII’s opposition
clause. The Court also approvingly quoted an EEOC guideline
expressing the view that an employee is protected under the
opposition clause when the “employee communicates to her employer
a belief that the employer has engaged in . . . a form of employment
156
discrimination.”
But what if the information the employee
provides is more neutral in character, or what if the employee is
acting as more of a facilitator, mediator, or intermediary? Is such an
employee covered if the employee incurs the employer’s wrath?
As was the case in Crawford, an employee may be dragged
involuntarily into an employer’s internal investigation or a coworker’s

155

Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 131 S. Ct. 1325, 1333 (2011).
Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., 129 S. Ct. 846, 851
(2009) (citing 2 EEOC Compliance Manual § 8-II(B)(1) (1998), available at
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/retal.html).
156
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157

lawsuit.
When the employee provides information in response to
questioning, the employee may not convey a belief that discrimination
has taken place and may even have no idea that the information she is
providing is damaging to the employer’s case. In such a case, an
employee would be providing information that is relevant to a charge
of unlawful activity but might not be “opposing” unlawful conduct
within the meaning of Title VII or another statute.
In one case, an employee was identified in discovery material as a
potential witness in a coworker’s FMLA lawsuit against an
158
employer.
The employer instructed the employee to notify the
employer if the coworker’s attorney contacted the employee about the
159
coworker’s FMLA claim.
The employee replied that he would not
tell the employer if he was contacted and that he would “tell the truth”
160
The district court concluded that these statements
if subpoenaed.
161
were too equivocal in nature to qualify as opposition conduct.
Nor,
the court concluded, had the employee engaged in protected activity
by participating in an FMLA proceeding because simply being listed
162
as a witness did not amount to participation.
Thus, the court
dismissed the employee’s retaliation claim on a Rule 12(b)(6)
163
motion.
There are also numerous cases in which one employee has assisted
another by helping to bring the coworker’s concerns over
discrimination to the attention of management. Yet, in all of these
cases, the courts have held that facilitating someone else’s complaint
or acting as an intermediary does not qualify as “opposing” unlawful
164
conduct.
It is only when the plaintiff’s assistance crosses the fine
157 See Harris v. Fulton-DeKalb Hosp. Auth., 255 F. Supp. 2d 1347, 1356 (N.D. Ga.
2002) (concluding that an employee who refused to participate in the employer’s internal
investigation into the coworker’s discrimination claim did not engage in protected
activity).
158 Lehmann v. Aramark Healthcare Support Servs., LLC, 630 F. Supp. 2d 388, 391 (D.
Del. 2009).
159 Id.
160 Id.
161 Id. at 393.
162 Id. at 394.
163 Id. at 394–95. The decision seems wrong on its face in light of the fact that the
FMLA’s antiretaliation provision protects not only those who provide information or
testify in a formal proceeding but also those who are “about to” provide information or
testify. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2615(b)(2)–(3) (2006). The fact that the employee had been listed as
a potential witness in the FMLA lawsuit seems like it should suffice to establish that the
employee was about to provide information or testify.
164 Moore v. City of Phila., 461 F.3d 331, 350 (3d Cir. 2006); Wells v. Securitas Sec.
Servs. USA, Inc., No. 07-15500, 2009 WL 818005, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 27, 2009);
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line into being more openly adverse to the employer’s interests that
165
Accordingly, it is unlikely that
the conduct amounts to opposition.
this type of plaintiff would be protected under the opposition clause.
This conclusion is largely bolstered by the Crawford decision.
Nearly all of the examples the Court used in attempting to explain
what qualifies as “opposing” unlawful conduct involved expressions
of disapproval communicated directly to the employer. From
providing a disapproving account to the employer of an employee’s
behavior, to communicating a belief to the employer that the
employer’s conduct was unlawful, to refusing to obey the employer’s
orders, the examples the Court relied upon involved expressions of
166
disapproval.
Admittedly, the Court’s opinion hints at the
likelihood that an employee who is involuntarily drawn into an
internal investigation and “report[s] discrimination in response to the
[employer’s] enquiries” should be considered to have opposed the
167
employer’s conduct.
But even here, the Court’s sympathy is
premised on the assumption that the employee expresses her belief to
the employer that discrimination has occurred. This is certainly the
view of Justices Alito and Thomas, who concurred in the judgment
but argued that the term “opposition” should include only “active and
168
purposive” conduct.
In sum, Crawford does not provide much

Sawicki v. Am. Plastic Toys, Inc., 180 F. Supp. 2d 910, 917–18 (E.D. Mich. 2001); Guess
v. City of Miramar, 889 So. 2d 840, 847 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004); see also Isler v.
Keystone Sch. Dist., No. 07cv1335, 2008 WL 3540603, at *11 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 12, 2008)
(rejecting a bus driver’s ADA retaliation claim that he was “advoca[ting] for a disabled
student” on his route by describing an incident and offering an alternative route because
there was no evidence “that he ever explicitly or implicitly opposed some discriminatory
practice”).
165 See Collazo v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Mfg., Inc., 617 F.3d 39, 49 (1st Cir. 2010)
(concluding that a supervisor who assisted and supported a subordinate in pursuing her
internal complaint had taken action adverse to employer and had engaged in protected
opposition conduct); Sumner v. U.S. Postal Serv., 899 F.2d 203, 209 (2d Cir. 1990)
(discussing protected opposition conduct in terms of “informal protests of discriminatory
employment practices, including making complaints to management, writing critical letters
to customers, protesting against discrimination by industry or society in general, and
expressing support of co-workers who have filed formal charges”).
166 Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., 129 S. Ct. 846, 850–51
(2009).
167 See id. at 852 (noting the unfairness of permitting an employer to fire an employee
who reports discrimination in response to employer-initiated questioning).
168 Id. at 854 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment).
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comfort to employees who do not openly express disapproval of an
169
employer’s actions to the employer.
While Title VII’s opposition clause and the Crawford decision
provide Title VII retaliation plaintiffs with at least some hope that
their efforts to assist another employee in conjunction with an internal
grievance of unlawful conduct might be classified as protected
opposition conduct, other retaliation plaintiffs do not have even this
hope. Title VII and its progeny are rare in their inclusion of statutory
protection for opposing unlawful conduct. Most federal statutes that
prohibit employer retaliation, including the FLSA, ERISA, and the
Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act
170
171
(USERRA) of 1994, do not contain an opposition clause.
Thus,
the employee who provides information to an employer as part of an
internal process or who otherwise provides information to the
employer in a neutral fashion must look elsewhere for protection.
Under the majority interpretations of these statutes, the employee
will probably look in vain. For example, numerous pre-Kasten
decisions from the lower courts concluded that when an employee’s
job duties involve ensuring compliance with the relevant law, the
employee does not “file any complaint” for purposes of a FLSA
retaliation claim simply by notifying the employer of potential wage
and hour law violations. Because the employee has not taken a
position adverse to the employer’s, the employee’s actions do not
172
qualify as filing a complaint.
While the Court in Kasten held that
the filing of an internal complaint was protected activity under the
FLSA, the Court emphasized that the purported complaint must be
formal enough to put the employer on notice “that a grievance has

169 See generally Calhoun v. U.S. Dep’t. of Labor, 576 F.3d 201, 212 (4th Cir. 2009)
(concluding that an employee did not engage in protected activity under OSHA’s
complaint clause because his complaints were not communicated to his supervisors).
170 38 U.S.C. § 4311 (2006).
171 See infra Appendix.
172 The leading case is McKenzie v. Renberg’s, Inc., 94 F.3d 1478, 1486–87 (10th Cir.
1996). Other decisions include Claudio-Gotay v. Becton Dickinson Caribe, Ltd., 375 F.3d
99, 102 (1st Cir. 2004) (concluding that an employee who reported potential overtime
violations to an employer did not engage in protected activity because the employee was
protecting the company rather than asserting rights adverse to the company), EEOC v.
HBE Corp., 135 F.3d 543, 554 (8th Cir. 1998) (stating that an employee must “‘step
outside’ his employment role” to be protected), and Muniz v. United Parcel Service, Inc.,
731 F. Supp. 2d 961, 970 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (concluding under an analogous state statute
that an employee’s act of reporting possible wage and hour law violations was not
protected activity because making such reports was part of her job).
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173

been lodged.”
The Court’s decision, therefore, arguably requires
that the employee take some type of adversarial stance before a
complaint is deemed to have been filed. Nor is it likely that any
language in a statute that protects those who testify or give
information in a proceeding will protect such employees because, as
discussed, courts have interpreted the relevant language to apply only
when an employee testifies or gives information in connection with a
174
formal proceeding of some kind.
C. No Protection for Third-Party Retaliation
The Supreme Court’s decision in Thompson resolved the issue of
whether an individual who faces an adverse action due to a
coworker’s protected activity under Title VII is an “aggrieved person”
entitled to a remedy under the statute. Both the ADEA and the ADA
175
Therefore, the
employ § 706’s “aggrieved person” standard.
176
Thompson decision should apply with equal force to these statutes.
However, the problem of third-party retaliation has also arisen under
other federal employment statutes, including the FMLA and
177
ERISA.
Given the differences in statutory language, it is
questionable whether the victims of third-party retaliation will have
any remedy under these and other federal statutes.
In Thompson, the plain language of § 704(a) of Title VII may have
precluded the Court from holding that this section authorized the
victims of third-party retaliation to recover damages. As discussed, §
704(a) speaks directly only to the individual who has engaged in
protected activity, not the employee who is fired as a consequence of
178
another individual engaging in protected activity.
Not surprisingly,
the Court looked to a different portion of Title VII to find the

173 Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 131 S. Ct. 1325, 1334 (2011)
(emphasis added).
174 See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
175 29 U.S.C. § 626(c)(1) (2006); 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a)(1) (2006).
176 See Leavitt v. SW & B Constr. Co., 766 F. Supp. 2d 263, 283 (D. Me. 2011) (stating
that Thompson’s holding likely extends to the ADA).
177 Elsensohn v. St. Tammany Parish Sheriff’s Office, 530 F.3d 368, 373 (5th Cir.
2008) (FMLA); Reich v. Cambridgeport Air Sys., Inc., 26 F.3d 1187, 1188 (1st Cir. 1994)
(OSHA); McKinnon v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ala., 935 F.2d 1187, 1188 (11th Cir.
1991) (ERISA); Fitzgerald v. Codex Corp., 882 F.2d 586, 589 (1st Cir. 1989) (ERISA).
See generally Leavitt, 766 F. Supp. at 283 (involving an allegation that a husband was
retaliated against because he testified on behalf of his wife in a workers’ compensation
hearing).
178 See supra notes 75–76 and accompanying text.
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statutory hook to permit recovery. In doing so, however, the Court
may have limited the ability of employees to succeed on similar
claims brought under other statutes.
Most federal employment statutes suffer from the same textual
limitations as § 704(a). For example, the Occupational Safety and
Health Act’s (OSHA) antiretaliation provision prohibits an employer
from retaliating against an employee “because such employee has
filed any complaint or instituted or caused to be instituted any
proceeding under or related to this [Act] or has testified or is about to
testify in any such proceeding or because of the exercise by such
employee on behalf of himself or others of any right afforded by this
179
[Act].”
ERISA and the FLSA both include similar language, as do
180
Thus, those who have
many of the lesser-known federal statutes.
faced an adverse employment action due to a coworker’s protected
activity under these other statutes must hope that the relevant statute
contains language similar to Title VII’s “person aggrieved” language
or contains some other statutory hook permitting recovery. Some
181
statutes contain this kind of language;
others, like USERRA, do
182
not.
If the statute in question does not contain the “aggrieved person”
language or something similar, the victim of third-party retaliation
would be forced to hope that the Court would gloss over the
unfavorable statutory text in favor of the policy against permitting
such employer behavior. But the fact that the Court in Thompson
never even considered this possibility and focused exclusively on
Title VII’s “aggrieved person” language would seem to undercut the
chances of this approach succeeding. Ironically, the Court’s singleminded focus in Thompson on Title VII’s “aggrieved person”
language may actually be a hindrance to retaliation plaintiffs outside
179

29 U.S.C. § 660(c)(1) (emphasis added).
See infra Appendix. The IRCA’s antiretaliation provision contains broader language
that might cover third-party retaliation. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(a)(5) (2006) (prohibiting
retaliation “against any individual for the purpose of interfering with any right or privilege
secured under this section”).
181 See, e.g., Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act, 29 U.S.C. §
1854(a) (containing “aggrieved person” language); Hernandez v. Ruiz, 812 F. Supp. 734,
735 (S.D. Tex. 1993) (establishing a right of action under the Migrant and Seasonal
Agricultural Protection Act for the children of farm workers even though the children were
not employees of the employer); see also, e.g., Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29
U.S.C. § 660(c)(2) (providing that “[a]ny employee who believes that he has been
discharged or otherwise discriminated against . . . in violation of this subsection” may file
a complaint) (emphasis added).
182 38 U.S.C. §§ 4322(a), 4323(d) (2006).
180
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of the Title VII context. Alternatively, the victim might be forced to
argue that denying recovery in such cases would produce absurd
results. But the Court has declared that it rarely invokes the absurdity
183
doctrine,
and textualist judges in particular tend to disfavor the
184
doctrine.
Even when a statute contains such language, the availability of a
remedy will not always be clear. For example, the FMLA provides
that “any eligible employee affected” by an employer’s unlawful
185
retaliation may recover damages or obtain equitable relief.
An
employee who is fired as a result of a coworker’s protected activity
would presumably be an “employee affected” by the employer’s
unlawful conduct under the reasoning of Thompson. However, only
employees who have worked for at least twelve months and for at
least 1250 hours in that twelve-month period are “eligible” under the
FMLA, thus effectively excluding some new or part-time employees
186
from coverage.
ERISA allows a “participant, beneficiary, or
fiduciary” to bring a civil action to enjoin an unlawful practice or
187
obtain equitable relief to address an unlawful practice.
ERISA
places no other restrictions on who may bring a civil action, so an
employee who has been discharged because a coworker engaged in a
protected act might be able to pursue a remedy based upon the
statutory language and the logic of Thompson. However, based on
prior Supreme Court precedent, some courts have concluded that
compensatory and punitive damages are not authorized for a violation
since the term “equitable relief” has been held not to encompass
188
monetary damages.
Thus, the victim of third-party retaliation
might be unable to obtain a monetary remedy under ERISA.
183

Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 459 (2002).
See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Judges as Honest Agents, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 915, 921 (2010) (noting “the textualist position that the absurdity doctrine should
be limited to linguistic problems; otherwise the judiciary can assume too much power by
waving its hand and declaring ‘absurdity’ whenever the law produces an unpleasant
result”).
185 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(1).
186 See, e.g., Nance v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 527 F.3d 539, 557 (6th Cir. 2008)
(concluding that an employee who failed to meet the 1250-hour requirement was not
covered under FMLA); Plumley v. S. Container, Inc., 303 F.3d 364, 372 (1st Cir. 2002)
(reinforcing the strict application of the requirement of 1250 hours within twelve months
and denying equitable arguments to the contrary).
187 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3); accord id. § 1140.
188 Alllinder v. Inter-City Prods. Corp., 152 F.3d 544, 552 (6th Cir. 1998); BarclayStrobel, supra note 139, at 559. Similarly, the FLSA provides that an employer who
engages in unlawful retaliation is “liable for such legal or equitable relief as may be
appropriate to effectuate the purposes” of the provision. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). The fact that
184
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D. Other Unresolved Issues
There are also a number of other interpretive issues that have yet to
be resolved by the Court. In some of these instances, it is possible to
imagine a majority of the Court concluding that the relevant text does
not pose a serious impediment to broader protection from retaliation.
In other instances, the relevant language may present significant
challenges to such an interpretation.
1. Anticipatory Retaliation
In the Title VII context, employers have sometimes taken action
against an employee before the employee has filed a charge because
the employer believes the employee may, or is about to, file a charge
189
of discrimination.
As a matter of strict construction, this type of
“anticipatory retaliation” would not be unlawful under § 704(a). That
is because, as written, § 704(a) protects only one who “has opposed”
(past tense) or “has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated”
(past tense) in a proceeding, not one whom the employer believes is
190
Nonetheless, several courts have
about to do these things.
concluded that anticipatory retaliation is actionable under Title VII’s
191
participation clause, despite the statute’s use of the past tense.
However, some courts have stuck to the literal language of § 704(a)
and concluded that anticipatory retaliation is not prohibited by the
192
participation clause.
The same issue has arisen with respect to
193
other statutes with similarly mixed results.
the ADEA and FLSA remedies provisions track each other might potentially assist a
plaintiff in such cases. See Johnson v. Martin, 473 F.3d 220, 222 (5th Cir. 2006). Some
statutes do not provide for a private right of action in the event of retaliation. See
Hernandez v. Mohawk Indus., Inc., No. 6:08-cv-927-Orl-28GJK, 2009 WL 3790369, at *5
(M.D. Fla. Nov. 10, 2009) (stating that the Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1982
does not provide for a private right of action).
189 See, e.g., Beckel v. Wal-Mart Assocs., Inc., 301 F.3d 621, 624 (7th Cir. 2002);
Sauers v. Salt Lake Cnty., 1 F.3d 1122, 1128 (10th Cir. 1993).
190 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006).
191 Beckel, 301 F.3d at 624; Sauers, 1 F.3d at 1128; EEOC v. Bojangles Rests., Inc.,
284 F. Supp. 2d 320, 328 (M.D.N.C. 2003). When the employee openly threatens to file a
charge of discrimination, the employee might also be protected because the employee has
“opposed” unlawful conduct. Reeder-Baker v. Lincoln Nat’l Corp., 649 F. Supp. 647, 656
(N.D. Ind. 1986).
192 See Booker v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 879 F.2d 1304, 1313 n.3 (6th Cir.
1989) (stating in dicta that threatening to file a charge is not protected participation
conduct); Beyah v. Dodaro, 666 F. Supp. 2d 24, 38 n.15 (D.D.C. 2009) (stating that an
employee could not claim to be protected under the retaliation claim after telling his
supervisors that he was documenting their discriminatory behavior); Reeder-Baker, 649 F.
Supp. at 656 (holding that the participation clause does not cover one who intends to file a
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In contrast, the FMLA specifically protects one who “has given, or
is about to give, any information” or testify in connection with a
194
proceeding.
A number of other statutes contain similar
195
language.
However, there are at least two reasons why this type of
statutory language provides less protection than might appear at first
glance. First, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has
interpreted the “about to give” language quite strictly, concluding that
the language protects an employee who is about to testify only in a
pending proceeding; thus, if an employer fears an employee may
testify in a proceeding related to a yet-to-be-filed lawsuit, the
196
employee would not be protected.
Second, some statutes—like the
FMLA—protect an individual who is retaliated against because he is
about to testify or provide information in connection with a formal
proceeding or inquiry but not to the individual who is retaliated
against because he was about to file a complaint or institute some type
197
of formal proceeding.
In contrast, the Title VII decisions
recognizing the viability of an anticipatory retaliation claim have
done so in the context of an employee who was fired because the
employer believed the employee was about to file a complaint or
198
institute a formal proceeding.
Thus, on its face, Title VII provides
no protection from anticipatory retaliation but, as interpreted by some
courts, actually provides greater protection in some respects than

discrimination charge); Burns v. Republic Sav. Bank, 25 F. Supp. 2d 809, 828 (N.D. Ohio
1998) (stating that the threat to file a charge is not protected activity under the
participation clause); EEOC v. Johnson Co., No. 1-75-Civ. 317, 1978 WL 197, at *9 (D.
Minn. Apr. 27, 1978) (same).
193 See Hill v. Mr. Money Fin. Co., 491 F. Supp. 2d 725, 736 (N.D. Ohio 2007)
(dismissing an employee’s retaliation claim because, even though the employee had
threatened to file a complaint under the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, he was fired before
he did so); Mascioli v. Arby’s Rest. Grp., Inc., 610 F. Supp. 2d 419, 430 (W.D. Pa. 2009)
(noting that several courts have treated termination of an employee in anticipation of
future leave, or exercising FMLA rights, as an actionable form of anticipatory retaliation).
194 29 U.S.C. § 2615(b)(2) (2006) (emphasis added).
195 See infra Appendix.
196 Ball v. Memphis Bar-B-Q Co., 228 F.3d 360, 364 (4th Cir. 2000) (FLSA). But see
Macktal v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 171 F.3d 323 (5th Cir. 1999) (concluding that a plaintiff
who expressed to his employer an intent to file a complaint with the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission was protected under similar language in the Energy Reorganization Act).
197 See infra Appendix. An exception would be the IRCA, which protects an employee
who “intends to file or has filed a charge or a complaint, testified, assisted, or participated”
in a proceeding. 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(a)(5) (2006).
198 See, e.g., Beckel v. Wal-Mart Assocs., Inc., 301 F.3d 621, 624 (7th Cir. 2002);
Sauers v. Salt Lake Cnty., 1 F.3d 1122, 1128 (10th Cir. 1993); EEOC v. Bojangles Rests.,
Inc., 284 F. Supp. 2d 320, 329 (M.D.N.C. 2003).
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those statutes that expressly address the problem of anticipatory
199
retaliation.
2. The Need for a Reasonable, Good-Faith Belief When Participating
in a Proceeding
Another issue yet to be resolved by the Court involves an
employee’s belief about the illegality of the employer’s conduct. An
employee is protected under Title VII when the employee has
opposed “any practice made an unlawful employment practice” by the
200
Act.
Read literally, an employee is protected only when the
practice in question is actually illegal. However, courts have
uniformly held that to be protected, an employee must simply have a
reasonable, good-faith belief that the conduct in question was
201
unlawful.
Crawford involved the issue of coverage under the
opposition clause, yet the Court never raised the issue of whether the
202
conduct that was opposed was actually unlawful under Title VII.
Therefore, it seems that, as a matter of established practice, an
employee need establish only that her belief as to the unlawful nature
of the employer’s conduct was reasonable in order to be protected
203
under the opposition clause.

199 A related issue is whether an employee is entitled to protection when an employer
takes action against the employee on the basis of a mistaken belief that the employee has
engaged in protected activity. There is a split of authority in the Title VII and FLSA
contexts as to whether an employee is protected under these circumstances. See Brock v.
Richardson, 812 F.2d 121, 123 (3d Cir. 1987) (recognizing such claims under the FLSA);
Ackel v. Nat’l Commc’ns, Inc., 339 F.3d 376, 385 (5th Cir. 2003) (refusing to recognize
such claims in the Title VII context); Aguilar v. Arthritis Osteoporosis Ctr., No. M-03243, 2006 WL 2478476, at *9 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 25, 2006) (rejecting such claims in the Title
VII context). Read literally, most antiretaliation provisions would apply only when an
employee actually engaged in protected activity. Aguilar, 2006 WL 2478476, at *9.
However, a few statutes explicitly provide protection when an employer believes an
employee has engaged in protected activity, regardless of whether the employee has
actually done so. See infra Appendix.
200 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006).
201 Brake & Grossman, supra note 15, at 914.
202 See Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., 129 S. Ct. 846
(2009).
203 Lower courts have also read this same requirement into other statutes with similar
language. See, e.g., Selenke v. Med. Imaging of Colo., 248 F.3d 1249, 1264 (10th Cir.
2001) (concluding that “a reasonable, good faith belief that the statute has been violated
suffices” to bring an ADA retaliation claim); Burnette v. Northside Hosp., 342 F. Supp. 2d
1128, 1134 (N.D. Ga. 2004) (stating that under the FLSA, “the complaining employee
must have an objectively reasonable, good-faith belief that the employer’s conduct is
unlawful”).
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In recent years, however, some courts have concluded that in order
to be protected under Title VII’s participation clause when filing a
charge of discrimination, an employee must also have a reasonable,
204
good-faith belief that the employer’s conduct was unlawful.
The
participation clause is silent on the question, but most courts have not
imposed a reasonableness requirement. Indeed, courts have expressly
held that the participation clause covers those who make “false,
205
malicious, or even frivolous complaints.”
These courts have
reasoned that imposing a reasonableness requirement on employees
would create a chilling effect and deter victims from coming forward
206
with what might be potentially valid claims.
Title VII is silent on
the issue, but statutory silence poses, at best, only a minor obstacle to
a pragmatic interpretation that furthers the goals of antiretaliation
provisions. Therefore, it is easy to envision the Supreme Court
adopting the majority interpretation. Indeed, given the fact that
§ 704(a) provides protection to one who has participated “in any
207
manner”—a phrase suggesting an expansive interpretation —
adoption of the majority interpretation is probably the most likely
outcome.
But not all statutes present obstacles that are so easily overcome.
Several other statutes governing the workplace explicitly provide that
an employee who files a complaint or provides information to a
government agency about a possible violation of the relevant law is
protected only when the employee acted with just cause or with a
208
reasonable belief that the conduct was unlawful.
Thus, a reviewing
204 See Lawrence D. Rosenthal, Reading Too Much Into What the Court Doesn’t Write:
How Some Federal Courts Have Limited Title VII’s Participation Clause’s Protections
After Clark County School District v. Breeden, 83 WASH. L. REV. 345, 349 (2008).
205 Id. at 370 (citing Gilooly v. Mo. Dep’t of Health & Senior Servs., 421 F.3d 734, 742
(Colloton, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (recognizing that some courts hold
that Title VII protects “even false and malicious allegations, or the filing of frivolous
complaints”)); see also Booker v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 879 F.2d 1304,
1312 (6th Cir. 1989) (stating that under the participation clause, protection “is not lost if
the employee is wrong on the merits of the charge, nor is protection lost if the contents of
the charge are malicious and defamatory as well as wrong”) (internal citations omitted);
Womack v. Munson, 619 F.2d 1292, 1298 (8th Cir. 1980) (“The merits of a charge made
against an employer is irrelevant to its protected status.”); Pettway v. Am. Cast Iron Pipe
Co., 411 F.2d 998, 1007 (5th Cir. 1969) (concluding that the fact that the charge contains
malicious material does not deprive an employee of protection under the participation
clause).
206 Rosenthal, supra note 204, at 395.
207 EEOC v. Bojangles Rests., Inc., 284 F. Supp. 2d 320, 328 (M.D.N.C. 2003).
208 Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1855(a)
(2006) (prohibiting retaliation “against any migrant or seasonal agricultural worker
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court might have little choice but to apply the text in a literal fashion
when dealing with these statutes. As a result, coverage under Title
VII may be more expansive than under other statutes in this respect.
3. Participation Involving Disloyal or Illegal Conduct
The “in any manner” language of Title VII’s participation clause
raises another interpretive issue. In some cases, retaliation plaintiffs
have engaged in illegal or disloyal conduct—such as wrongfully
copying an employer’s records—in anticipation of filing a formal
209
complaint or have lied during the course of a formal proceeding or
210
Thus, one question that has arisen is whether such an
lawsuit.
employee has engaged in protected participation conduct.
While Title VII’s participation clause protects one who participates
“in any manner” in a formal proceeding, its opposition clause lacks
this expansive language. As a result, courts have consistently
concluded that the participation clause affords greater protection from
211
retaliation than does the opposition clause.
Thus, an employee
who engages in disloyal or illegal behavior may not be entitled to
protection under the opposition clause, whereas an employee who
engages in disloyal or illegal conduct while participating in a
proceeding could be protected if the “in any manner” language is read
212
literally.

because such worker has, with just cause, filed any complaint or instituted, or caused to be
instituted, any proceeding under or related to this chapter, . . . or because of the exercise,
with just cause, by such worker on behalf of himself or others of any right or protection
afforded by this chapter”); Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 111-353,
§ 402, 124 Stat. 3885 (codified at 21 U.S.C.A. § 399d(a)(1) (West 2011)) (prohibiting
retaliation against an employee who “provided, caused to be provided, or is about to
provide or cause to be provided to the employer, the Federal Government, or the attorney
general of a State information relating to any violation of, or any act or omission the
employee reasonably believes to be a violation of any provision of this chapter or any
order, rule, regulation, standard, or ban under this chapter, or any order, [or] rule”); see
infra Appendix.
209 See, e.g., Lord v. City of Ozark, No. 1:10cv451-WHA, 2010 WL 4780680, at *6
(M.D. Ala. Nov. 17, 2010) (involving an employee who disobeyed her employer’s order
not to communicate with another employee regarding a pending investigation).
210 See Rosenthal, supra note 204, at 369 (citing Gilooly v. Mo. Dep’t of Health &
Senior Servs., 421 F.3d 734, 740 (8th Cir. 2005)) (explaining that “employees cannot gain
protection under Title VII after filing false charges, lying to investigators, or making
defamatory statements”).
211 See Vaughn v. Epworth Villa, 537 F.3d 1147, 1152 (10th Cir. 2008) (noting the
general approach).
212 See id. (reaching this conclusion); see also Deravin v. Kerik, 335 F.3d 195 (2d Cir.
2003) (“[R]ead naturally, the word ‘any’ has an expansive meaning, and thus, so long as
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At the same time, some courts have taken the position that there
must be some limit to the participation clause’s protection. Thus,
some courts have held or suggested that an employee who lies in the
course of an EEOC proceeding or who engages in illegal or disloyal
conduct in the course of a proceeding is subject to dismissal, either
213
because the conduct is not protected under the participation clause
or because the employer has a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason
214
for firing the employee.
Once again, Title VII’s language differs from that of many other
federal statutes that lack the “in any manner” language. While most
statutes addressing the workplace contain antiretaliation provisions
that protect employees who participate or provide information to a
government agency, few contain Title VII’s expansive “in any
215
manner” language.
Thus, there is an additional level of difficulty
present when construing one of these statutes in a case involving
216
disloyal or illegal employee behavior.
4. Assistance
Another potential interpretive problem results from the failure of
several major federal employment statutes to prohibit retaliation
against those who assist other employees. A Title VII retaliation
plaintiff who has provided assistance in connection with some type of
Congress did not add any language limiting the breadth of that word, the term ‘any’ must
be given literal effect.” (internal quotations omitted)).
213 See Niswander v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., No. 5:06CV1086, 2007 WL 1189350, at *10
(N.D. Ohio Apr. 19, 2007); see also O’Day v. McDonnell Douglas Helicopter Co., 79 F.3d
756, 763–64 (9th Cir. 1996) (concluding that an employee’s act of rummaging through the
employer’s records in an attempt to uncover evidence is not protected under the opposition
clause); Jefferies v. Harris Cnty. Cmty. Action Ass’n, 615 F.2d 1025, 1036 (5th Cir. 1980)
(concluding that an employee’s act of copying and disseminating personnel records is not
protected opposition conduct); Watkins v. Ford Motor Co., No. C-1-03-033, 2005 WL
3448036 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 15, 2005) (concluding that an employee’s act of copying
personnel records and providing them to his attorney was not protected activity under a
parallel state statute). See generally Martin v. Mecklenburg Cnty., 151 F. App’x 275,
280–81 (4th Cir. 2005) (expressing reluctance “to conclude that an employer can never
dismiss an employee for lying during a Title VII investigation, proceeding, or hearing”).
214 Vaughn, 537 F.3d at 1153; Lord, 2010 WL 4780680, at *6; see also Mattson v.
Caterpillar, Inc., 359 F.3d 885 (7th Cir. 2004) (explaining that the defendant’s warning to
the plaintiff that “making false accusations of sexual harassment could lead to disciplinary
action and discharge” was a legitimate interest to the company rather than retaliation).
215 See infra Appendix.
216 See generally Federal Credit Union Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1790b(d)(2) (2006) (providing
that the protections of the whistleblower section of the Act do not apply to an employee
who “knowingly or recklessly provides substantially false information” to a federal
examiner).
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formal proceeding related to a discrimination claim is expressly
217
This
entitled to protection under Title VII’s participation clause.
language has been held to protect an employee who assists another
218
employee in connection with a proceeding.
The ADEA and ADA
219
Some other federal statutes are
each contain similar language.
even more explicit, providing protection to one who acts or exercises
220
a right on behalf of another.
In contrast, the FLSA, the FMLA, and
ERISA do not explicitly provide protection from retaliation to those
who provide assistance in connection with their discrimination
221
claims.
These statutes do protect those who testify or give
222
information in connection with a proceeding under the statutes.
However, “assistance” may take other forms apart from providing
testimony.
An employee might “assist” a coworker by providing financial
223
assistance in conjunction with a lawsuit.
An employee might assist
224
or
in a proceeding by accompanying a coworker to a proceeding
225
providing encouragement to a coworker who is pursuing a claim.
The fact that Title VII’s antiretaliation provision protects those who
provide assistance “in any manner” only bolsters these
226
conclusions.
But none of these actions would probably be
protected under the FLSA, ERISA, or any number of other statutes
that prohibit employer retaliation but lack comparable assistance
language.
For example, one federal court held prior to Kasten that the
FLSA’s antiretaliation provision protected an employee who
circulated a petition requesting assistance to stop an alleged FLSA
217

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006).
Owens v. Rush, 654 F.2d 1370, 1379 (10th Cir. 1981).
219 29 U.S.C. § 623(d) (2006); 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a).
220 See infra Appendix.
221 The FMLA protects an individual who “has given, or is about to give, any
information in connection with any inquiry or proceeding relating to any right provided
under this subchapter.” 29 U.S.C. § 2615(b)(2). This language might cover various forms
of “assistance.” However, as explained infra, other forms of assistance might not be
covered.
222 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (FLSA); 29 U.S.C. § 2615(b)(2) (FMLA); 29 U.S.C. § 1140
(ERISA).
223 EEOC v. Bojangles Rests., Inc., 284 F. Supp. 2d 320, 329 (M.D.N.C. 2003).
224 Owens v. Rush, 654 F.2d 1370, 1379 (10th Cir. 1981).
225 See Long, supra note 69, at 987 (arguing that providing moral support to an
individual pursuing a discrimination charge should qualify as assisting “in any manner”).
226 See Bojangles Rests., 284 F. Supp. 2d at 329 (noting the expansive nature of this
phrase).
218
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227

overtime violation.
Such conduct might conceivably amount to the
filing of a complaint under Kasten, but it would not be an easy
argument to make. Instead, what the employee was expressly doing
was requesting assistance. But what if a coworker had taken the
employee up on his request? Would the coworker be protected under
the FLSA? The coworker’s actions might be viewed as a form of
opposition under Crawford’s reasoning, but opposition is not a
protected form of conduct under the FLSA. Even if opposition is
protected under a statute, assisting a coworker would probably not
amount to opposition unless, at a minimum, the employer was aware
228
of the assistance.
And it would be quite a stretch to conclude that
an employee who comes to the aid of a coworker has filed a
complaint. Thus, the likely result in such a case is that the employer
would be free to retaliate against the assisting coworker.
Other forms of coworker assistance may be left unprotected by
§ 704(a) of Title VII. For example, an employee who is considering
filing an internal complaint of a supervisor’s discrimination might
want to gather as much information as possible about the supervisor’s
actions. A coworker who provides the employee with information
about other instances of discriminatory conduct on the part of the
supervisor may have “assisted” the employee or “given information”
to the employee. But, as discussed above, the coworker has not
assisted or given information in connection with a formal proceeding,
so the coworker’s actions would probably not be protected under
229
§ 704(a)’s participation clause.
Unless the coworker’s assistance
was open and obvious to the employer, it probably would not qualify
230
as opposition conduct under Title VII.
For the same reasons, it is
unlikely that the assisting coworker would be protected under most
other federal statutes.
III
THE ACCIDENT OF TEXT
As Part II illustrates, the law regarding employment retaliation is
complicated. Nearly every statute employs different language,
forcing the parties, their lawyers, and the courts to engage in
227 Legutko v. Local 816, Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 606 F. Supp. 352 (E.D.N.Y. 1985),
aff’d on other grounds, 853 F.2d 1046 (2d Cir. 1988).
228 See supra notes 166–67 and accompanying text.
229 See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
230 See supra notes 165–170 and accompanying text.
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sometimes difficult undertakings to discern their meanings. But more
importantly, the law regarding employment retaliation is
unnecessarily complicated.
Inconsistency abounds with respect to protection from retaliation in
231
To provide just one
federal statutes regulating the workplace.
more example, consider the interplay of several federal safety statutes
as compared to Title VII. As discussed, the employee who provides
information in a neutral manner internally to an employer about a
violation of Title VII is not protected from retaliation, but the
employee who is more adversarial in providing the information is
protected, unless it is part of the employee’s job to provide this kind
232
of information.
Turning to the safety statutes, the employee who,
in a neutral manner, provides information to the employer about a
233
(an act that deals
violation of the Toxic Substances Control Act
with, among other things, the disposal of asbestos) or the Asbestos
234
School Hazard Detection and Control Act is probably not protected
from retaliation because those statutes explicitly protect only those
who make an external report about a violation or participate in formal
governmental proceedings. However, an employee who provides
information in a neutral manner internally to the employer about a
violation of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act is protected
from retaliation, even if it is part of the employee’s job to provide the
235
information.
If there is logic here, it is difficult to see. One might attempt to
justify the different outcomes under Title VII and the Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act by arguing that those who provide
231 See Richard R. Carlson, Citizen Employees, 70 LA. L. REV. 237, 243 (2009)
(“[W]hile the number and variety of laws protecting citizen employees seems impressive,
these laws form an incomplete, inconsistent, and unreliable patchwork.”); Christopher
Wiener, Note, Blowing the Whistle on Van Asdale: Analysis and Recommendations, 62
HASTINGS L.J. 531, 537 (2010) (“In effect, Congress has enacted whistleblower
protections on a somewhat ad hoc basis as it has considered various regulatory schemes.”);
Trystan Phifer O’Leary, Note, Silencing the Whistleblower: The Gap Between Federal and
State Retaliatory Discharge Laws, 85 IOWA L. REV. 663, 670–71 (2000) (noting the
tendency of some federal statutes to provide insufficient protection from retaliation). See
generally Orly Lobel, Lawyering Loyalties: Speech Rights and Duties Within TwentyFirst-Century New Governance, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 1245, 1249 (2009) (noting
whistleblower protection at the state and federal law level and concluding that
“whistleblower protections have developed as a patchwork and, as a consequence, vary
significantly in their scope and application”).
232 See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
233 15 U.S.C. § 2622(a) (2006).
234 20 U.S.C. § 3608 (2006).
235 21 U.S.C.A. § 399d(a) (West 2011).
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information to an employer about a violation of the law that poses a
serious risk to public health or safety should be entitled to greater
protection than others who provide information about other types of
violations of the law, such as discrimination. But if the primary
concern is in bringing to the employer’s attention threats to safety and
health, why is the employee whose job requires the reporting of
violations of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act entitled to protection
but the employee whose job it is to report violations of an employer’s
illegal disposal of asbestos likely not entitled to the same protection
under the Toxic Substances Control Act and Asbestos School Hazard
Detection and Control Act?
And, to be clear, this is not an isolated instance of inconsistency.
Randomness pervades the federal approach to employer retaliation.
In Burlington Northern, the Court emphasized that one of the
purposes of Title VII’s antiretaliation provision—to prevent harm to
individuals based on their protected activity—could not be achieved
“by focusing only upon employer actions and harm that concern
236
employment and the workplace.”
Thus, to be effective, an
antiretaliation provision must also reach nonemployment-related
retaliation. Surely that principle should apply to any antiretaliation
provision. Yet, the antiretaliation provisions of numerous federal
statutes, by their terms, would seem to be limited to employment237
As
related actions, whereas others provide greater protection.
importantly, there seems to be no unifying theme that would explain
why the language varies; some safety statutes, by their terms, are
seemingly limited to employment-related forms of retaliation,
238
whereas others provide more expansive protection from retaliation.
In some instances, courts have justified their strict reading of
antiretaliation provisions by speculating as to why Congress might
have inserted or omitted a particular word or phrase that results in an
employee being denied a remedy in the case of employer retaliation.
236

Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 63 (2006).
See supra notes 125–128 and accompanying text.
238 Compare Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. § 815(c)(1) (2006)
(prohibiting employers from discharging “or in any manner” discriminating against an
individual who engages in protected activity), with Toxic Substances Control Act, 15
U.S.C. § 2622(a) (prohibiting employers “from discharg[ing] any employee or otherwise
discriminat[ing] against any employee with respect to the employee’s compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment”); see also Richard Moberly, Protecting
Whistleblowers by Contract, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 975, 982 (2008) (noting that the federal
antiretaliation “statutory framework results in a network of narrow protections that
evolved on an ad hoc basis to support specific statutory schemes”).
237
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But the most that can usually be said for these supposed rationales is
that they provide judges with a means of rebutting any potential
argument that a literal reading of the statutory language leads to an
239
absurd result. Rarely are the explanations persuasive.
For
example, prior to Thompson, some lower courts offered two possible
explanations for why Congress might have consciously chosen not to
protect the victims of third-party retaliation. First, given Title VII’s
protection for those who provide assistance “in any manner” to one
who has filed a complaint, Congress might have assumed that these
victims might already be covered under this provision; therefore,
there was no need for a separate provision prohibiting third-party
240
retaliation.
Whatever force this argument may have carried with
respect to Title VII, it carries absolutely no weight with respect to a
statute that does not provide protection to one who provides
assistance to another, and it has only limited application to a statute
lacking the “in any manner” language. Second, lower courts have
suggested that Congress may have been concerned about the potential
for virtually unlimited liability if one could claim protection from
retaliation simply because a coworker engaged in protected activity,
thereby interfering with an employer’s ability to fire an employee at
241
will.
This is certainly a possible explanation. But it isn’t at all
likely, if for no other reason than that a jury is unlikely to believe that
an employer fired a virtual stranger in order to retaliate against an
employee who engaged in protected activity. Instead, the most likely
reason for the lack of any explicit protection for the victims of thirdparty retaliation is that Congress simply failed to consider the
possibility.
There have been numerous theories advanced in an attempt to
explain the purpose of antiretaliation provisions. The Supreme Court
has emphasized that one benefit of protecting employees who provide
information to an employer about a possible violation of a law
regulating the workplace is that it encourages informal internal
242
dispute resolution.
The Court has repeatedly emphasized the
desirability of allowing employers to address potential violations of
the law internally instead of promoting the more expensive, time-

239 See Fogleman v. Mercy Hosp., Inc., 283 F.3d 561, 569 (3d Cir. 2002)
(acknowledging that proffered justifications were not “particularly convincing”).
240 See Holt v. JTM Indus., Inc., 89 F.3d 1224, 1227 (5th Cir. 1996).
241 E.g., Fogleman, 283 F.3d at 570.
242 Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 131 S. Ct. 1325, 1334 (2011).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2010084

LONG

572

1/31/2012 1:39 PM

OREGON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 90, 525
243

consuming, and adversarial route of agency enforcement.
The
Court’s justification has the benefit of being consistent with human
behavior. In general, employees prefer to voice their concerns over
suspected misconduct internally rather than going outside the confines
244
of the employer’s organization to law-enforcement authorities.
Employees who report wrongdoing often do so not in a
confrontational manner but out of a sense of loyalty or duty to the
245
employer.
Thus, to the extent antiretaliation provisions are
premised on the desire to encourage the most efficient means of
246
uncovering and addressing wrongdoing,
they should protect not
just those who oppose or complain internally about unlawful conduct,
but those who simply provide, in a nonadversarial manner,
information about illegal behavior to the employer.
The Court has also emphasized the important role that
antiretaliation provisions play in furthering the substantive goals of
the relevant statutory scheme. As Richard Moberly has argued, it
seems clear that the Court views protection from retaliation as
essential to furthering the enforcement of law designed to benefit the
247
public at large.
In Kasten, for example, the Court emphasized that
limiting protection from retaliation to situations in which an employee
filed a written complaint with an employer would undermine
Congress’s goal of protecting worker safety when it enacted the Fair
248
Labor Standards Act.
Yet to the extent federal law seeks to promote these values, it does
so in an inconsistent fashion. No unifying theory can explain the
patchwork of federal statutory antiretaliation provisions. If, for
example, robust protection from employer retaliation is essential to
furthering Congress’s law-enforcement goals, there should be acrossthe-board protection for employees who are the victims of third-party
retaliation. Instead, Congress provided a statutory remedy to some
“aggrieved” persons but not to others. If internal reporting of safety
243

Id.; see also Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
See Richard E. Moberly, Sarbanes-Oxley’s Structural Model to Encourage
Corporate Whistleblowers, 2006 BYU L. REV. 1107, 1142 (noting the tendency of
whistleblowers to report internally).
245 Id. at 1143 (noting that employees’ sense of loyalty often prevents them from
blowing the whistle externally).
246 See Moberly, supra note 1, at 380 (stating that Supreme Court retaliation decisions
are premised upon, inter alia, the assumption that “employees are in the best position to
know about illegal conduct”).
247 Id.
248 Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 131 S. Ct. 1325, 1333 (2011).
244
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violations is an important aspect of promoting public safety, those
who raise concerns with their employer about such safety violations
should be protected from retaliation. Yet protection for those who
raise internal concerns about safety hazards is spotty. If employees
need assurance that they will not be retaliated against for bringing
wrongdoing to light, then all antiretaliation provisions should include
protection from anticipatory retaliation. Yet, while some do, most do
not.
To its credit, the Court may have attempted to impose some order
upon the statutory mishmash. But the reality is that the statutory
framework allows for disparate treatment of similarly situated
individuals, and this disparate treatment undermines the purposes of
affording protection from retaliation. And unlike in other situations,
it is virtually impossible to ascribe logic to the existing patchwork of
protection. The Supreme Court was heavily criticized for its highly
restrictive interpretations of the ADA—interpretations that appeared
249
inconsistent with what seemed to be the purposes of the Act.
But
at least in the ADA context, it was possible to articulate some
argument for why Congress might have wanted to make it more
difficult for individuals with physical or mental impairments to state a
250
discrimination claim than other individuals.
The same cannot be
said for the disparity of treatment of retaliation plaintiffs. No
unifying theory can explain why an employee who is fired because
his spouse filed a claim of race discrimination against the employer is
entitled to a remedy but an employee who is fired because his spouse
filed a complaint alleging a violation of consumer fraud laws is not.
249

See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
In Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., the Court interpreted the ADA so as to limit the
number of individuals who could claim disability status under the Act. See 527 U.S. 471
(1999). In Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, the Court concluded
that the terms within the ADA’s definition of disability must be “interpreted strictly to
create a demanding standard for qualifying as disabled.” 534 U.S. 184, 197 (2002).
Samuel R. Bagenstos has argued that the Supreme Court’s restrictive readings of the
ADA’s definition of disability are less troubling if the purpose of the ADA is viewed more
as a form of welfare reform, designed to get individuals with disabilities off of disability
benefit rolls and into the workforce, than as a civil rights statute. Samuel R. Bagenstos,
The Americans with Disabilities Act as Welfare Reform, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 921,
976–78 (2003). Similarly, others have argued that the fact that the ADA imposes costs on
employers in the form of workplace alterations and other types of accommodations
designed to allow individuals with disabilities to perform the essential functions of their
jobs helps explain the Court’s narrow reading of the definition of disability. See Samuel
Issacharoff & Justin Nelson, Discrimination with a Difference: Can Employment
Discrimination Law Accommodate the Americans with Disabilities Act?, 79 N.C. L. REV.
307, 336–37 (2001) (discussing this theory).
250
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This problem is not confined to workplace retaliation claims.
Federal employment discrimination law is also filled with a host of
251
conflicting standards.
Judges, juries, the parties, and their lawyers
must navigate their way through a maze of proof structures and
causation standards that vary depending upon the type of evidence of
discriminatory intent a plaintiff possesses, what the plaintiff’s
allegations are with respect to the defendant’s motive, and whether
the plaintiff is alleging discrimination on the basis of age, disability,
252
race, or some other protected characteristic.
The current state of
the law is, to put it mildly, confusing. But what is especially
remarkable about the complex framework for analyzing
discrimination claims is how unnecessarily complex it all is. As
Professor Sandra Sperino has observed, “there is nothing especially
complex about employment discrimination law that suggests it should
253
work differently than other kinds of cases,” a fact confirmed by the
reality that many of the elaborate frameworks that have been
constructed and deconstructed ad nauseam are abandoned when a
254
case actually reaches trial.
But the problem of conflicting statutory and judicial standards is
exacerbated in the case of antiretaliation provisions just given the
sheer number of such provisions in the U.S. Code. Reading a
representative sample, one is left with the firm conclusion that the
landscape of federal antiretaliation provisions is the way it is because

251 See William R. Corbett, Babbling About Employment Discrimination Law: Does the
Master Builder Understand the Blueprint for the Great Tower?, 12 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 683,
690–91 (2010) (noting the current complexity in employment discrimination law); Martin
J. Katz, Gross Disunity, 114 PENN ST. L. REV. 857, 858 (2010) (noting the Court’s shift
away from interpreting discrimination statutes to bring about uniformity); Sandra F.
Sperino, Rethinking Discrimination Law, 110 MICH. L. REV. 69, 75 (2011) (noting the
complexity in disparate treatment and disparate impact law). See generally Jeffrey M.
Hirsch, The Law of Termination: Doing More with Less, 68 MD. L. REV. 89, 89 (2008)
(“The laws and regulations governing the American workplace reveal a level of
complexity and uncertainty that rivals virtually any other area of law.”).
252 See Catherine T. Struve, Shifting Burdens: Discrimination Law Through the Lens of
Jury Instructions, 51 B.C. L. REV. 279, 315–19 (2010) (discussing the possible application
of burden-shifting schemes depending upon the type of discrimination alleged); see also
Serwatka v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., 591 F.3d 957, 962 (7th Cir. 2010) (holding that
mixed-motives proof structure available in Title VII cases is not available in ADA cases).
A similar issue may arise in retaliation cases given the fact that different statutes employ
different causation standards. See generally Katz, supra note 251, at 860–62 (noting the
different causation standards employed in federal law).
253 Sperino, supra note 251, at 118.
254 Id. at 120–21.
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255

of inattentive drafting on the part of Congress.
Ultimately,
whether a retaliation plaintiff wins or loses is more likely to be the
result of an accident of text than it is part of a coherent legislative
256
scheme or purpose.
Retaliation victims may sometimes avoid some of the pitfalls of
257
unfriendly statutory text through creative pleading.
In other
instances, they might encounter judges who are willing to look to the
purposes underlying antiretaliation provisions and overlook what
258
appears to be the obvious meaning of statutory language.
But there
are costs to these approaches, just as there are costs resulting from the
current level of complexity in the area. And even if my conclusions
about the likely outcomes of some of the interpretive issues included
in this Article prove to be incorrect, the costs that accrue in the
interim are significant. These costs include the expenditure of
resources by parties in an attempt to understand the law and predict
the outcome of future behavior and litigation. There are also costs to
the judiciary in terms of the expenditure of judicial resources in an
259
attempt to reconcile the conflicting standards.
There is also a cost
in terms of the loss of judicial credibility as courts attempt to offer
260
plausible explanations for the differing outcomes in these cases.
And if I am correct in my predictions, the most significant cost to the
current statutory framework is the inability of retaliation law to carry
out its purposes. All too often the result may be that individuals
who—under virtually any conception of the purpose of antiretaliation
laws—should be protected from retaliation will go unprotected, while
255 Professor Jeff Hirsch has argued that the same problem exists with regard to the
rules governing termination of the employment relationship. See Hirsch, supra note 251,
at 90 (stating that the termination rules governing the workplace “have developed over
time, with little to no attention focused on the regulatory structure as a whole”).
256 See generally Carlson, supra note 231, at 243 (“A citizen employee’s protection
against retaliation and interference depends as much on the luck of geography, occupation,
and the law the employer violated as on the merits of the employee’s conduct or the value
of his action to the community.”).
257 See Long, supra note 69, at 988–89 (discussing how victims of third-party
retaliation might prevail).
258 See supra note 77 and accompanying text (noting that some courts prior to
Thompson had permitted claims of third-party retaliation despite statutory language).
259 See Hirsch, supra note 251, at 96.
260 See Jack L. Landau, Some Observations About Statutory Construction in Oregon, 32
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 1, 10 n.30 (1996) (“Reliance on interpretive fictions . . . undermines
the credibility of the judicial decision-making process, particularly when the fictions are at
odds with the realities of ordinary experience.”); see also Corbett, supra note 251, at 691
(arguing in favor of symmetry in employment discrimination law because “the laws should
be perceived by the public to be sensible and fair”).
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their counterparts who are fortunate enough to be able to sue under a
different statute are able to state a claim.
IV
THE NEED FOR A UNIFORM STANDARD
Stated simply, the use of multiple antiretaliation standards
consisting of language seemingly adopted in a haphazard manner
produces more costs than it does benefits. The solution to the
problem is actually quite simple. Congress could, with relative ease,
adopt one antiretaliation provision that would apply to virtually all
forms of employer retaliation.
When a particular federal statute raises special concerns, Congress
could specify that the model antiretaliation provision would not apply.
For example, there is voluminous decisional law under the National
261
262
Labor Relations Act (NLRA) dealing with employer retaliation.
Imposing a new standard for employer retaliation in this setting might
add unnecessary confusion. Thus, NLRA retaliation cases might be
exempted. Perhaps statutes implicating national security might be
exempted. But absent some compelling reason why a federal statute
should employ its own unique retaliation standard, all federal statutes
regulating the workplace that currently contain antiretaliation
provisions should be subject to one unifying standard.
Any standard should promote the policy values underlying
antiretaliation provisions that the Court has already identified. These
include the desirability of encouraging internal resolution of disputes
and possible violations of law, preserving employee access to the
statutory mechanisms designed to deal with possible violations of the
substantive law, and ensuring employer compliance with the
applicable statute’s substantive provisions. In order to promote
consistency, any standard should also incorporate any existing
261

29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2006).
Of course, retaliation against employees for exercising their rights under federal
labor law has its own set of problems. See Benjamin I. Sachs, Enabling Employee Choice:
A Structural Approach to the Rules of Union Organizing, 123 HARV. L. REV. 655, 681
(2010) (“[W]orkers bear a substantial risk of losing their jobs should they support a
unionization effort, and among those union supporters who are not discharged or formally
disciplined for their activity, many face softer forms of retaliation that are nonetheless
quite significant and can diminish career prospects.”); see also Michael H. Gottesman, In
Despair, Starting Over: Imagining a Labor Law for Unorganized Workers, 69 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 59, 62 (1993) (arguing that the main reason employees do not unionize is fear of
employer retaliation and that “[t]he NLRA does not protect workers meaningfully against
employer reprisal for attempts to unionize”).
262

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2010084

LONG

1/31/2012 1:39 PM

2011]

Employment Retaliation and the Accident of Text

577

Supreme Court holdings that clarify the scope of an employee’s
entitlement to protection from retaliation.
While the exact language of such a provision can be left to the
drafters, any antiretaliation measure should protect employees when
retaliation occurs in any of the following situations:
(1) Because the individual has provided information to the
employer, law enforcement, or government official about a
violation of federal law applicable to the workplace that the
employee reasonably believes has occurred, is occurring, or is about
to occur, including when it is part of the employee’s job to provide
such information.
(2) Because the individual has opposed, in a reasonable
manner, a violation of law that the employee reasonably believes
has occurred, is occurring, or is about to occur.
(3) Because the individual has made a charge, testified,
assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation,
proceeding, or hearing under the relevant statute.
(4) Because the individual has assisted another in any of these
actions.
(5) Because the employer believes the individual has done any
of the above or may do any of the above.
(6) Because of the individual’s association with an individual
described in (1)–(5) above.

In addition, protection should not be limited to instances involving
retaliation occurring in the workplace. In keeping with the Court’s
holding in Burlington Northern, retaliation should be prohibited when
it is materially adverse (that is, when it might dissuade a reasonable
263
employee from engaging in the protected conduct).
There are few downsides to this approach. The adoption of one
unifying antiretaliation provision would provide employers and
employees with a better ability to predict the future consequences of a
particular act, and it would reduce the need for the parties and judges
to devote substantial resources to trying to distinguish and reconcile
the conflicting standards that presently apply. Admittedly, more
employees who are unable to recover under existing law would be
able to recover under the proposed standard. However, employer
concerns over the possibility of increased litigation and liability are
somewhat muted by at least two realities.

263

Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006).
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First, the benefits of predictability should somewhat offset some of
these increased costs. In 2008, Congress amended the ADA’s
264
definition of disability.
The new definition is far more expansive
and should make it significantly easier for plaintiffs to establish the
existence of a disability and thereby potentially claim entitlement to
265
protection under the statute.
Congress accomplished this result
266
with cooperation from business interests.
At the time, however,
employers were obtaining a significant benefit from the existing
definition of disability, as evidenced by the fact that employers were
consistently winning the overwhelming majority of disability
267
discrimination cases.
Thus, employers seemingly had little
incentive to go along with any change that would make it easier for
plaintiffs to claim protection. Yet go along they did. While business
interests may have seen the writing on the wall with regard to an
amended definition of disability after the election of a Democratic
Congress around that time, it is also entirely possible that business
interests recognized the value of greater predictability. According to
the legislative history of the ADA Amendments Act, the relevant
stakeholders recognized the need for a framework that would be
“more predictable, consistent, and workable for all entities subject to
268
responsibilities under the ADA.”
The new definition of disability
269
provides greater clarity in many respects,
thus limiting the
potential for costly disagreements, ex and post ante, as to coverage.
Second, in order to prevail, an employee still must establish a
causal connection between the employer action and the protected
270
employee activity.
This is not always an easy task. A substantial
delay between employee action and employer response may make it
271
difficult for the employee to establish a connection.
Similarly,
jurors may find it difficult to believe there was a causal connection in
264 ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 2, 122 Stat. 3553 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. § 12101 (West 2011)).
265 Sharona Hoffman, The Importance of Immutability in Employment Discrimination
Law, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1483, 1493 (2011).
266 See David G. Savage, Job Discrimination Bill to Widen Who’s Covered, L.A. TIMES,
Sept. 8, 2008, at 13 (noting the support of the Chamber of Commerce).
267 See Sharona Hoffman, Settling the Matter: Does Title I of the ADA Work?, 59 ALA.
L. REV. 305, 308–09 (2008) (discussing plaintiffs’ “extremely low win rates under Title I
of the ADA”).
268 154 Cong. Rec. 19,098 (2008) (Manager’s Statement).
269 Hoffman, supra note 265, at 1493.
270 Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 272 (2001).
271 See id. at 273–74 (concluding that causation was not established when there was a
twenty-month gap between the protected activity and the adverse employer’s action).
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some instances. For example, while employers have expressed
concern about the scope of the Court’s holding in Thompson that the
victims of third-party retaliation have a remedy under Title VII, the
reality is that it will be difficult for a plaintiff to convince a jury that
an employer retaliated against the employee for the employee’s
protected conduct by firing a coworker unless there was some type of
close connection between the employee and the coworker. Likewise,
the human resources manager whose job it is to inform management
of possible violations of law may have a difficult time convincing a
jury that she was fired for doing her job rather than for some other
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason. Ultimately, the causation
element of a retaliation claim serves to limit an employer’s potential
liability.
CONCLUSION
A majority of the Supreme Court may take an expansive view of
the role of antiretaliation provisions. But the Court has also
established a practice of focusing first and foremost on the text of
statutory antiretaliation provisions. It is only after the Court can
plausibly assert that the text permits a particular reading that the
Court is willing to discuss the functional considerations supporting
that interpretation. Therefore, despite the success that retaliation
plaintiffs have enjoyed before the Court in recent years, future
retaliation plaintiffs are unlikely to prevail if the statutory language
strongly suggests a contrary outcome.
The reality is that there are many federal antiretaliation
provisions—some contained in prominent statutes, others in lesserknown statutes—that contain potentially strong obstacles to an
expansive interpretation. And while there may be a unifying
interpretive principle underlying the Supreme Court’s retaliation
jurisprudence, there is no unifying principle underlying the statutory
antiretaliation framework at the federal level. The statutory language
in many instances seems to have been borrowed from other sources in
some instances and created sua sponte in others, with no apparent
rhyme or reason. The result is that similarly situated victims of
retaliation are likely to be treated differently due to the accident of
text. In order to address the costs resulting from the current state of
affairs, Congress should adopt a single antiretaliation provision that
would apply to all federal statutes that currently contain workplace
retaliation provisions.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2010084

LONG

1/31/2012 1:39 PM

580

OREGON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 90, 525

APPENDIX
Retaliation
Contains an
prohibition linked opposition
to compensation, clause?
terms, conditions,
or privileges of
employment?

Express
protection for
providing
information
about
unlawful
conduct to
employer?

Express
protection for
providing
information
about
unlawful
conduct to
employer as
part of job?

Express
protection
from
anticipatory
retaliation?

Express
requirement
of good-faith,
reasonable
belief of
unlawful
conduct when
filing a
formal
complaint?

Express
protection for
participating
“in any
manner” in a
proceeding?

Express
protection for
providing
assistance?

Title VII, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e3(a)

No

Yes

No

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

ADEA, 29
U.S.C. § 623(d)

No

Yes

No

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

ADA, 42 U.S.C.
§ 12203(a) & (b)

No

Yes

No

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

No

Yes (for
testifying in
connection
with a
proceeding
or serving on
an industry
committee;
no for other
activities)

No

No

No

No

Yes (for
giving
information
or testifying
in connection
with a
proceeding;
no for filing
a charge)

No

No

No

No

Yes (for
giving
information
or testifying
in connection
with a
proceeding;
no for other
activities)

No

No

No

Yes (for
testifying in
connection
with a
proceeding;
no for other
activities)

No

No

Yes (exercise
of rights on
behalf of
others)

FLSA, 29 U.S.C.
§ 215(a)(3)

FMLA, 29
U.S.C. § 2615

ERISA, 29
U.S.C. § 1140

No

No

No

No

Yes

No

No

No

No

OSHA, 29
U.S.C. § 660

No

No*

No

No

Asbestos School
Hazard
Detection and
Control Act, 20
U.S.C. § 3608

Yes

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

Surface
Transportation
Assistance Act
of 1982, 49
U.S.C. § 31105

Yes

No

No

Yes

No

No

Yes

Migrant and
Seasonal
Agricultural
Worker
Protection Act,
29 U.S.C.
§ 1855(a); id.
§ 1854(a)

No

No

No

No

No

No

Yes

Immigration
Reform and
Control Act, 8
U.S.C.
§ 1324b(a)(5)

No

No

No

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

Federal Credit
Union Act, 12
U.S.C.
§ 1790b(a)
(employees of
credit unions)

Yes

No

No

No

No

No

No

Yes

Consumer
Product Safety
Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 2087

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Toxic
Substances
Control Act, 15
U.S.C. § 2622

Yes

No

No

No

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes (refusal
to perform
task)

Yes (“with
just cause”)
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Employment Retaliation and the Accident of Text
Retaliation
prohibition
linked to
compensation,
terms,
conditions, or
privileges of
employment?

Contains an
opposition
clause?

Express
protection for
providing
information
about
unlawful
conduct to
employer?

Express
protection for
providing
information
about
unlawful
conduct to
employer as
part of job?

Express
protection
from
anticipatory
retaliation?

Express
requirement of
good-faith,
reasonable
belief of
unlawful
conduct when
filing a formal
complaint?

581
Express
protection for
participating “in
any manner” in
a proceeding?

Express
protection for
providing
assistance?

Wendell H. Ford
Aviation
Investment and
Reform Act for
the 21st Century
(AIR 21), 49
U.S.C. § 42121

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

No

Yes

Federal Food,
Drug, and
Cosmetic Act, 21
U.S.C. § 399d

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

Yes

No

No

Yes, (for
providing
information
“to any other
person”)

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

Yes

No

No

No

No

Asbestos Hazard
Emergency
Response Act, 15
U.S.C. § 2651
The Federal Mine
Safety and Health
Act of 1977, 30
U.S.C. § 815

Yes
(exercising
rights on
behalf of
another)

Energy
Reorganization
Act (ERA), 42
U.S.C. § 5851

Yes

Yes (refused
to engage in
action)

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Pipeline Safety
Improvement Act
(PSIA), 49 U.S.C.
§ 60129

Yes

Yes (refused
to engage in
action)

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Clean Air Act
(CAA), 42 U.S.C.
§ 7622

Yes

No

No

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

Safe Drinking
Water Act
(SDWA), 42
U.S.C. § 300j-9

Yes

No

No

No

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Comprehensive
Environmental
Response,
Compensation,
and Liability Act
(CERCLA), 42
U.S.C. § 9610

No

No

No

No

Yes (but only
for testifying,
not filing a
complaint)

No

No

No

Federal Water
Pollution
Prevention and
Control Act
(FWPPCA), 33
U.S.C. § 1367

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

Yes

No

Yes (but only
for testifying,
not filing a
complaint)

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

Yes

Solid Waste
Disposal Act
(SWDA), 42
U.S.C § 6971
Uniformed
Services
Employment and
Reemployment
Rights Act of
1994 (USERRA),
38 U.S.C. § 4311

Yes (“any
adverse
employment
action”)

* Indicates the existence of Supreme Court precedent suggesting a different outcome.
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